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Chapter 2: Yesterday's Paranoia is
Today's Reality: Documentation of
Police Surveillance of First
Amendment Activity
MARC STICKGOLD*

1. INTRODUCTION
The February 1974 newsletter of the Michigan Association for
Consumer Protection (MACP), a small citizens' group, contained a
half-page critique of a state senator who was "Chairman of the
subcommittee that has power to kill consumer protection bill
4001."1 The critique's author, Walter Benkert, president of MACP,
called the contents of the senator's 1973-74 report "garbage," and
went on to attack the senator as "support[ing] the business preferences over the people's need for protection."2 Benkert concluded
that House Bill "4001 will either die in committee or become a
watered down bill . . . . "3 The newsletter closed with a verse commemorating MACP's recent struggle over mobile home safety and
noting the organization's intentions to continue fighting for consumer rights. 4
Shortly after the newsletter was issued, a member of the Michigan House of Representatives sent a letter to the director of the
Michigan State Police, requesting the director to "note the attached
.. Associate Professor of Law & Director of Clinical Programs, Golden Gate University
School of Law. B.A., 1960, University of Illinois; J.D., 1963, Northwestern University. The
author wishes to extend deepest gratitude to his co-counsel and comrades in this work:
Attorneys George Corsetti, Margaret Nichols, and Richard Soble. They are responsible in
innumerable ways for whatever good and helpful ideas this Article might contain, as well as
for providing the author constant support.
1. MICH. Assoc. FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION, NEWSLETTER, Feb. 1974, at 1. The full fourpage mimeograph newsletter is attached as an appendix to the Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief in Benkert v. Michigan State Police, No. 74-023-934-AZ (Wayne County Cir.
Ct., Mich., filed July 26, 1974).
House Bill 4001, the "Michigan Consumer Protection Act," authorized the Attorney
General to combat deceptive and unfair trade practices by seeking injunctive relief, restitution, recovery of investigation costs, and civil penalties. The bill was introduced in the
Michigan House on January 10, 1973, was passed by the House as amended, on January ao,
1974, and was passed by the Michigan Senate on December 15,1976. See MICH. COMPo LAWS
§ 445.901 (Supp. 1977).
2. NEWSLETI'ER, supra note 1, at 1.
3. ld.
4. ld. at 4.
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[newsletter] from the Michigan Association for Consumer Protection, I would like to know what this organization is."s The letter also
requested information on Benkert, the MACP president and author
of the critique. Less than two weeks later, the Intelligence Section
of the Michigan State Police sent a memo to the director. The memo
summarized and quoted from the MACP's articles of incorporation
(filed with the State Department of the Treasury), and concluded:
"We have no information that the group is subversive or violent."6
A copy of this memo found its way to the criticized senator,1 and
the matter appeared closed.
Thereafter, a member of the MACP discovered that the Michigan State Police had been making inquiries concerning the activities and political views of the group and its members. 8 The result
of this revelation was Benkert v. Michigan State Police,9 a suit
challenging the legality of such a politically motivated inquiry, as
well as attacking the entire "subversive investigations" apparatus
of the state police. Following publicity about the suit 10 and the
police admission that the "inquiry" was "unauthorized,"11 the complaint was amended to greatly expand the suit. 12 It has since proceeded with fourteen plaintiffs as representatives of "a class action
which seeks to declare the existence and operation of the Michigan
State Police and Detroit Police 'subversive units' illegal and unconstitutional; to enjoin their continued existence and operation; and
to enjoin a wide range of illegal and unconstitutional police activ5. A copy of the letter sent to Colonel Plants, Director of the Michigan State Police,
by Representative Huffman, on February 22, 1974, was also forwarded to the state senator
who was the subject of criticism in the MACP newsletter. The letter to Colonel Plants is
attached as an appendix to the Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 1.
6. This memo is attached as an appendix to Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 1.
7. Id.
8. George Corsetti, a member of MACP, indicated, in an interview with the author on
March I, 1975, that an official of a state agency concerned with consumer affairs contacted
him and related that the state police had inquired ofthe official concerning the political views
of the MACP and its members.
9. Benkert v. Michigan State Police, No. 74-023-934-AZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct.,
Mich., filed July 26, 1974).
10. Detroit Free Press, July 27, 1974, at 3, col. 2; Detroit News, Oct. 20, 1974, at 2B,
col. 1; Detroit News, Aug. 29, 1974, at 9A, col. 2.
11. See Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Benkert
v. Michigan State Police, No. 74-023-934-AZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct., Mich., filed Aug. 8,
1974) at 3. See also Detroit Free Press, Aug. 24, 1974, at col. 2 Detroit Free Press, Sept. 28,
1974, at 7A, col. 1.
12. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Benkert v. Michigan State Police, No. 74-023-934-AZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct., Mich., filed Apr. 8, 1975)
Ihereinafter cited as First Amended Complaint]. The expansion of the lawsuit to include
the Detroit Police Dep't was the result of investigation by plaintiff's counsel which revealed
facts indicating extensive political surveillance by the Detroit Police.
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ity."13 The complaint further alleged that this spy apparatus operated primarily against those who expressed "political, economic,
religious, social or other unpopular or critical views" in "lawful,
peaceful and constitutionally protected" ways.14 That criminality
was not the focus of this police surveillance was explicitly alleged. 15
The specific factual allegations by plaintiffs in Benkert were
wide ranging, encompassing numerous police illegalities in addition
to the allegation that the state police served as political police for a
state legislator .16 The complaint asserted numerous violations of the
United States and Michigan constitutions and laws, and sought
wide-ranging relief. 17 The most significant thrust of the complaint
focused on first amendment rights and values. It asserted that unless relief were granted,
rights of freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of
assembly, freedom of association, freedom to petition . . .
government . . . [and] right to privacy . . . will continue
to be infringed, threatened, impeded, penalized, and otherwise interfered with by defendants. . . .18
Additional constitutional and statutory questions were raised by the
allegations, but it is the first amendment issues that are pertinent
to the analysis undertaken in this Article.
This Article in no way intends to litigate vicariously the significant issues raised in Benkert. The brief discussion of that case is to
provide some background for an understanding of the empirical
study and analytical discussion that follows. It is hoped that this
Article will help relieve the first amendment dilemma posed by
secret police intelligence apparatuses through a study and analysis
of over seven hundred pages of police political intelligence documents obtained through discovery in Benkert.
II.

JUDICIAL COMMENT ON POLITICAL SURVEILLANCE

Before proceeding to the study and analysis of police political
intelligence documents, consider the present first amendment dilemma posed by police surveillance of political activity. Judicial
examination of first amendment values involved in political intelligence gathering has been called inadequate by an earlier commenta13. First Amended Complaint, supra note 12 at 111.
[d. 11 22B.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

11 30-78.
11 79.
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tor .19 In discussing only one aspect of the intelligence gathering process, that commentator concluded that "police use of undercover
agents has been considered in only the most superficial fashion."20
The passage of a few years, the Supreme Court decision in Laird v.
Tatum,21 and the post-Watergate cases22 do not detract from the
validity of this conclusion.
In a flurry of activity beginning with Anderson v. Sills,23 in
1969, courts have been confronted with many first amendment concerns of political surveillance and dossier maintenance. The Supreme Court provided its primary comment on this subject in 1972,
with Laird v. Tatum. 24 By 1975, three additional significant opinions had been added-Philadelphia Yearly Meeting v. Tate, 25
Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General,26 and White v. Davis. 21
The "first major court test"28 of a political intelligence apparatus was in Anderson v. Sills,29 a case raising issues "on the perimeter
of first amendment doctrine."30 It involved the "right-or-wrong of
the police to maintain dossiers on political dissidents."31
In April 1968, New Jersey Attorney General Sills issued a memorandum entitled, "Civil Disorders-The Role of Local, County,
and State Government," to municipal and county officials within
19. Note, Police Undercouer Agents: New Threat to First Amendment Freedoms. 37
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 634, 637 (1969). "To say that the Supreme Court has not dealt adequately
with the threat of police undercover agents is not to single it out for criticism; in general,
neither legislatures nor police administrative authorities have performed any more satisfactorily." Id.
20. Id. See Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966). In these cases. not involving
first amendment considerations. the use of informers and undercover agents in criminal
investigations was approved. This view has been reaffirmed in Weatherford v. Bursey, 429
U. S. 545 (1977). See also United States v. White. 401 U. S. 745 (1971); Alderman v. United
States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969). (Both White and Alderman evaluated electronic surveillance in
light of the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches. See generally Stone,
The Scope af the Fourth Amendment: Priuacy and Police Use of Spies, Secret Agents and
Informers, 1976 A.B.F. RESEARCH J. 1193.
21. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
22. See, e.g., Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
23. 106 N.J. Super. 545, 265 A.2d 298 (1969), reu'd, 56 N.J. 210, 265 A.2d 678 (1970).
24. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
25. 382 F. Supp. 547 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd in part, 519 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1975).
26. 387 F. Supp. 747 (S.D.N.Y.), uacated on condition, 510 F.2d 253 (2d Cir.).
application for stay denied, 419 U.S. 1314 (1974).
27. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 533 P.2d 222 (1975).
28. Comment, Political Surueillance and Police Intelligence Gathering-Rights,
Wrongs, and Remedies, 1972 WIS. L. REV. 175, quoting New York Times, June 2,1970, at 1.
col. 2.
29. 106 N.J. Super. 545, 256 A.2d 298 (1969), reu'd, 56 N.J. 210, 265 A.2d 678 (1970).
30. Askin, Police Dossiers and Emerging Principles of First Amendment Adjudication.
22 STAN. L. REv. 196 (1970).
31. Id.
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New Jersey.32 Undoubtedly prompted in part by a "number of civil
disorders" in New Jersey during 1967, as well as more general concerns over, and resistance to, social demands of the sixties, the
memorandum dealt "with many aspects of the problem of civil disorder, including methods of planning, mutual assistance between
municipalities,"33 and other aspects of prevention and control of
civil disorders. The Sills plan included the expansion and coordination of local and state intelligence activities. Standarized forms
(Nos. 420 and 421) were distributed to every police department in
the state, with instructions to "routinely" submit these forms, and
the "vital intelligence" therein, to the "State Police Control Security Unit."34
Form 420, the Incident Report Form, called for reports on anticipated, in progress, and completed incidents, which include a
"[c]ivil disturbance, riot, rally, protest, demonstration, march,
confrontation . . . . "35 Requested were the full details on individuals and organizations involved in those incidents, along with the
political designation of all the organizations.36 Form 421 was utilized
for reporting personal data on any individual who, in the judgment
of a local police officer, "may be connected with potential civil
disorder problems."37
The plaintiffs in Anderson-civil rights, anti-war, and community activists-challenged the constitutionality of Attorney General Sills' reporting system. They requested an injunction against
the surveillance activities of police, and the destruction of dossiers
maintained under the Sills system.38 After disposing of assertions
that plaintiffs lacked standing, the
trial court considered the "secret
c
files" mandated by the Sills memorandum to be "inherently dangerous" and by their "existence tend[ed] to restrict those who
32. See Anderson v. Sills, 106 N.J. Super. 545, 547, 256 A.2d 298, 299 (1969).
33. Id. at 548, 256 A.2d at 299. See also Comment, Secret Files: Legitimate Police
Activity or Unconstitutional Restraint on Dissent?, 58 GEO. L.J. 569 (1970). Anderson has
been the object of extensive commentary. See, e.g., Comment, Chilling Political Expression
by Use of Police Intelligence Files: Anderson v. Sills, 5 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV.
71 (1970) (trial court decison); Comment, Political Surveillance and Police Intelligence Gathering-Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 1972 WIS. L. REv. 175; Comment, Protective Intelligence Systems and the Courts, 58 CAL. L. REv. 915 (1970).
34. 56.N.J. at 218, 265 A.2d at 682.
35. 106 N.J. Super. at 548, 256 A.2d at 306. Forms 420 and 421, and the accompanying
instructions, are set out in full in the appendices to the decision. Id. at 558-66, 256 A.2d at
305-13.
36. "EXAMPLES OF TYPES: Left wi!lg, Right wing, Civil Rights, Militant, Nationalistic, Pacifist, Religious, Black Power, Ku Klux Klan, Extremist, etc." Id. at 548, 256 A.2d
at 307.
37. Id. at 549, 256 A.2d at 300.
38. Id.. at 547, 256 A.2d at 299.
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would advocate, within protected areas, political and social
changes."39 Since the attack on Sills' system was "on its face" (Le.,
as described in the memorandum, without regard to actual police
practices or purposes), and since "there are no relevant issues of fact
which must be determined, "40 the trial court proceeded by summary
judgment to grant the prayed for relief in full. 41
Although conceding that "the objects of the actions of the Attorney General taken he:re are well within the established police
power of the State, "42 the trial court found three separate first
amendment deficiencies. First, the Attorney General had not borne
the necessary burden of establishing a substantial relation between
information sought and a subject of overriding or compelling state
interest. 43 A sufficient "nexus" between the reporting system and
the prevention of civil disorder was not established. 44 Second, the
"impact of the . . . official act" on "those who would not complain
because of the chilling effect" outweighed the "governmental goals
[of] controlling unprotected and illegal conduct," and therefore
constituted an impermissible infringement on first amendment
rights. 45 Third, the official action in this case went "beyond areas
reasonably necessary to reach the permissible governmental goal."46
The trial court concluded that the memorandum and reporting
forms "overreach in their attempt to achieve" governmental goals,
both explicitly and because of the "lack of standards" for use of the
forms.47
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the trial court,48 indicating that "[h]ere we are dealing with the critical power of government to gather intelligence to ena.ble it to satisfy the very reason for
its being, "49 and that, therefore, "the basic approach must be that
the executive branch may gather whatever information it reasonably believes to be necessary to enable it to perform the police
39. [d. at 557-58, 256 A.2d at 305.
40. [d. at 549, 256 A.2d at 300. The only factual issues determined by the trial court
concerned plaintiffs' standing, and those were quickly resolved by judicial notice of the
plaintiffs' political activities.
41. [d. at 558, 256 A.2d at 305.
42. [d. at 552, 256 A.2d at 302.
43. [d. See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539, 546
(1963).
44. 106 N.J. Super. at 553-55, 256 A.2d at 302.
45. [d. at 555, 256 A.2d at 303.
46. [d.
47. [d. at 557, 256 A.2d at 304.
48. 56 N.J. at 231, 265 A.2d at 689.
49. [d. at 226, 265 A.2d at 687.
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roles."50 The court expressed a very restrictive view of the issues51
and indicated the impropriety of resolving the case by summary
judgment.52
The New Jersey Supreme Court, whether addressing the issue
of summary judgment or plaintiffs' standing, made clear its presumptive approval of the challenged police conduct and its disbelief
of plaintiffs' concerns. 53 The court indicated that a constitutional
challenge to the police conduct in question would be sustained only
if the wrongful conduct was "real and not fanciful"54 and that, in
this case, plaintiffs' allegations were: "merely hypothetical, "55
"academic,"56 or "a figment of fear that the government itself may
run amuck."57
The trial court and New Jersey Supreme Court opinions in
Anderson are archetypal of subsequent opinions in police spy litigation, and illustrate what has been characterized as the "rightssecurity spectrum."58 In confronting constitutional attacks on police
surveillance of political activity, courts (or judges) initially make a
significant value choice, between first amendment rights and public
or state security, and then employ almost automatically a complex
of presumptions about police and citizen behavior.
The court's avenue of approach to the rights-security spectrum
is again exemplified by contrasting the majority and dissenting
opinions of the United States Supreme Court in Laird v. Tatum. 59
50. Id. at 229, 265 A.2d at 688.
51. See Comment, Political Surveillance and Police Intelligence Gathering-Rights,
Wrongs, and Remedies, 1972 WIS. L. REv. 175, 177, quoting 56 N.J. at 226,265 A.2d at 687.
52. 56 N.J. at 215, 265 A.2d at 681. "[Tjhe issue as projected by plaintiffs on motion
for summary judgment was a mere abstraction." Id. at 226, 265 A.2d at 687.
53. Id. at 215, 218, 265 A.2d at 681, 682. After six years of negotiation and preparation
for trial, the complaint in Anderson was dismissed on alternative grounds. Since the Anderson
memorandum had been superceded and was no longer in effect, the case was declared moot.
The court also stated that even if the complaint was not moot it failed to state a cause of
action under the first amendment. Anderson v. Sills, 143 N.J. Super. 432, 363 A.2d 381 (1976).
54. 56 N.J. at 220,265 A.2d at 684.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 226, 265 A.2d at 687.
57. Id. at 229, 265 A.2d at 689.
58. Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Comm. v. Gray, 480 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1973).
There has been detected a tendency in recent times to justify invasion of constitutional rights on the basis of national security. . . . The tendency has not been wholly
recent of course . . . I start with the premise-and I suspect the majority would not
disagree with the premise, though the majority opinion commences at the other end
of the rights-security spectrum-that a group, even a huge group, of people who want
to go to the seat of government to protest a war and who do so peaceably have the
right not to have their name . . . listed in some dossier or table or catalog ofprotesters and disseminated throughout all the major branches of the "security system" of
the United States.
Id. at 334, (Oakes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
59. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
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This case, like Anderson, involved a broad-based challenge to the
Army's surveillance of lawful and peaceful civilian political activity.
The litigation was admittedly prompted in part by a magazine article by a former Army intelligence agent.60 The case unearthed an
Army "intelligence system . . . aimed principally at gathering information about dissident domestic political activity, "61 and numerous resulting abuses. 62 In Tatum, the Supreme Court addressed the
Issue:
whether the jurisdiction of a federal court may be invoked
by a complainant who alleges that the exercise of his first
amendment right is being chilled by the mere existence,
without more, of a governmental investigative and datagathering activity that is alleged to be broader in scope
than is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of a
valid governmental purpose. 63
•

The Court found the "allegations of a subjective 'chill'''64 inadequate to substitute "for a claim of specific present objective harm
or a threat of specific future harm. . . . "65 The plaintiffs therefore
lacked federal standing, and the district court's dismissal was reinstated. 66
The Supreme Court considered two aspects of federal justiciability other than standing. It hinted at considerations of
"mootness," or at least substantial change in circumstances making
the complaint staleY The Court also addressed political question
concerns, and announced deference to the Army while criticizing the
appellate court's conclusion that it could "hear evidence, ascertain
facts, and decide what, if any, further restrictions. . . are called for
to confine the military to their legitimate sphere of activity. . . . "68
Federal courts are not the "monitors of the wisdom and soundness
of Executive action," the court stated; that role is "appropriate for
the Congress acting through its committees and the 'power of the
GO. [d. at 2 n.l. "The complaint filed in the District Court candidly asserted that its
factual allegations were based on a magazine article: 'The information contained in the
foregoing paragraphs numered five through thirteen [of the complaint] was published in the
January 1970 issue of the magazine The Washington Monthly' . . . ." [d.
1. Note, Judicial Review of Military Surveillance of Civilians: Big Brother Wears Modern Army Green, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1009, 1009 (1972).
62. [d. 1010-11.
63. 408 U.S. at 10.
64. [d. at 13-14.
65. [d. at 14.
66. [d. at 26.
67. Military Surveillance, supra note 61, at 1013 n.45.
68. 408 U.S. at 15.
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purse' .
."69 The Court indicated that judicial intervention may
be appropriate where "actual present or immediately threatened
injury resulted[ed] from unlawful government action."70
In Tatum, the "subjective chill" alleged by plaintiffs was insufficient to warrant their standing. 7t The Court distinguished prior
first amendment cases from the present case, noting that the past
first amendment "chilling" resulted from "regulations, proscriptions or compulsions,"72 none of which was involved in the Army's
political intelligence apparatus. 73 Nevertheless, the manner in
which the Court deals with the tripartite avoidance gambitpolitical question, standing, mootness-all present a restrictive
view of the first amendment concerns involved. Chief Justice
Burger carefully steps through a lengthy court of appeals opinion,
quotes only those phrases supporting denial of review, seems to
ignore those phrases pressing otherwise, and then, after stating the
appellate court conclusion, finds that the appellate court "decided
the issue incorrectly."74
The dissent of Justice Douglas in Tatum expressed two concerns unmentioned by the majority. First, there was no implied
authority in the constitution for military surveillance over civilians,
and Congress had passed "no law authorizing surveillance over civilians . . . ."75 Justice Douglas concluded, therefore, that there
was absolutely no basis for sustaining any military intrusion in this
area. Second, Justice Douglas addressed the majority's concerns of
standing. Under his perception of the facts, the Army's surveillance
activities were "paralyzing," and plaintiffs' first amendment injury
was certainly "not a remote, imaginary" one.76
The opposed ends of the rights-security spectrum are exemplified by the two opinions in Tatum. The majority of the Court viewed
the case from the "security" end of the spectrum, as did the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Anderson, resulting in a maze of security
assumptions and lack of standing for plaintiffs. The Tatum dissent,
however, like the trial court in Anderson, placed free expression
values in the traditional "preferred position," a view from the
"rights" end of the same spectrum that would have permitted the
court to forthrightly address the first amendment issues raised.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

[d.
See Military Surveillance, supra note 61, at 1025-28.
408 U.S. at 13.
[d. at 16.
[d. at 11.
[d.
[d.
[d.
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Mter Anderson and Tatum, it appeared that the courts were
not ready to impose constitutional restrictions on police surveillance
of political activity. Three recent opinions indicate that the courts
may have reconsidered this position; all sustained claims of
"corruption of the democratic process"77 caused by political surveillance as justiciable.
The first of these three cases was Socialist Workers Party v.
Attorney General,78 in which the trial court awarded plaintiffs a
short-lived victory. In the context of an ongoing omnibus suit attacking wide ranging "illegal surveillance and harassment"79 of the
Socialist Workers Party (SWP) by various governmental officials
and agencies (during which a past FBI program of disruptive activities at SWP and Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) conventions was
revealed) ,80 the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to prohibit FBI surveillance of an upcoming YSA convention scheduled
for December 28, 1974.81 The trial court, noting that a "principal
use" of the information gathered by the FBI was to deter government employment and that "FBI surveillance would inevitably put
a substantial inhibition and barrier upon the normal carrying out
of these meetings and the normal ability to attract young persons
to attend them," granted plaintiffs' request on December 13, 1974.82
Eleven days later, the Second Circuit reversed the lower court's
declaration of "a substantial impairment of the First Amendment
rights" of the SWP and the YSA, and the finding of "no compelling
interest and no other necessity" for FBI surveillance of the convention. 83 The court of appeals was not persuaded by the admitted
program of disruption against the SWP, and found the surveillance
justified by national security concerns. The appellate court's opinion relying primarily on in camera inspection of FBI materials, was
77.
78.
denied,
79.
80.

Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 419 U.S. 1314, 1316 (1974).
387 F. Supp. 747 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 510 F.2d 253 (2d Cir.), application for stay
419 U.S. 1314 (1974).
387 F. Supp. at 748.
510 F.2d at 254.
81. [d.
82. 387 F. Supp. at 749·50.
83. 510 F.2d at 257. Plaintiffs, on October 25, 1974, asked for a preliminary injunction
restraining the FBI from attending and surveilling the 14th National Convention of the Young
Socialist Alliance to be held from December 28, 1974 to January I, 1975. Because of the
shortage of time before that Convention, the matter was adjudicated on an accelerated basis.
The district court granted an injunction on December 13, 1974. On December 24, 1974, the
court of appeals vacated that order (except as to certain restrictions on the dissemination of
information obtained). Plaintiffs then requested a stay of the court of appeals' decision and
reinstatement of the district court injunction, both of which were denied on December 27,
1974, by Justice Marshall, sitting as Circuit Judge.
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shallow at best and disingenous at worst. 84 The Second Circuit twice
chastised the trial court for proceeding when no "urgency" was present,85 and therefore vacated the preliminary injunction. 86
On December 27, 1974, Justice Marshall, sitting as circuit
judge, heard an emergency application to stay the order of the court
of appeals and to reinstate the preliminary injunction. 87 Justice
Marshall noted the "unsavory picture of deceit and political sabotage" presented by plaintiffs88 and that "government surveillance
and infiltration cannot . . . be taken lightly," but warned that
"abhorrence for abuses of governmental investigative authority cannot be permitted to lead to indiscriminate willingness to enjoin"
such activities. 89 Therefore, the plaintiffs' requested relief was denied,90 and the YSA convention began on December 28, 1974 with
the FBI surveillance apparatus in tact. The significance of this case,
aside from its fault of no "urgency," is that Justice Marshall found
plaintiffs' allegations sufficient to satisfy federal standing require84. Even I1ccepting the fact that the Second Circuit had only a few days to prepare its
opinion, its cavalier acceptance of the applicability of Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), was
feeble, and without any analysis of the differing allegations and evidence in the present case.
The court simply concluded, "We are not greatly persuaded with respect to the validity of
these or other asserted distinctions. . . . [T]he FBI's use of the information gathered by it
from attendance of the YSA conventions seems parallel to that of the Army as described in
Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent in Laird v. Tatum." 510 F.2d at 256.
The court borders on the disingenuous not only by its failure to recognize the differences
between Tatum and the present case, but also because it applies the rule of the majority in
Tatum to a set of facts analogized to those set out in the Tatum dissent. As is clearly pointed
out by Judge Winter, dissenting in Donohue v. Duling, 465 F.2d 196, 202 n.l (4th Cir. 1972),
another police surveillance case, the majority and dissenting Justices in Tatum had different
interpretations of the record in that case.
The court of appeals decision in Socialist Workers Party is also feeble because of its
limited consideration of the first amendment implications involved. The court's total discussion involved a quotation from Justice Jackson's concurrring and dissenting opinion in American Communications Assoc. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 445 (1950), which, even when written,
took a severely restrictive view of first amendment rights-more restrictive than the full Court
has ever taken. The view of the first amendment put forth in the Douds opinion has never
been applied to clandestine governmental surveillance of, and intrusion into, protected political expression.
85. The Second Circuit first noted that the urgency resulted from the trial judge's
determination of disputed factual issues, improperly made on the basis of affidavits. 510 F.2d
at 255. Secondly, the court indicated that it found no urgency requiring the FBI to cease its
continuing surveillance of the YSA, which, it felt, had not resulted in serious injury in the
past. [d. at 256.
86. [d. at 257. Only that portion of the injunction which barred transmission of names
to the Civil Service Commission was affirmed.
87. 419 U.S. 1314 (1974).
88. [d. at 1317.
89. [d. at 1319.
90. [d. at 1320.
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ments. 91 The courthouse door was opened again, but only ever so
slightly.
As in Anderson and Tatum, Socialist Workers Party illustrates
how the basic values or presumptions of a court (in reference to the
rights-security spectrum) may dictate the resolution of the case.
The trial court in Socialist Workers Party predicted injury to rights
of expression if FBI surveillance continued, and, therefore, granted
the preliminary injunction. 92 The court of appeals foresaw serious
threats to our society, if surveillance is limited, and vacated the
injunction. 93 The tension created by these opinions will be reduced
only when courts have an "empirical basis on which to make judgments about the necessity, and the danger, of police covert investigative activities directed at lawful political expression."94 It is hoped
that this Article will provide some of that badly needed empirical
basis.
The second case was Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends v. Tate. 95 In this case, a complaint was
brought under the Civil Rights Act of 187196 against the City of
Philadelphia police officials for their political surveillance program
that included photographing and recording attendants at peaceful
and lawful public assemblies and demonstrations, and maintaining
dossiers on individuals' political and personal backgrounds. 97 The
suit also challenged the dissemination of gathered information (a)
to other law enforcement agencies, (b) to private agencies and government agencies with no law enforcement concerns, and (c) on a
television broadcast in which certain individuals and groups were
specifically identified as subjects of police information-gathering. 98
The district court, feeling bound by Laird v. Tatum, dismissed
plaintiffs' complaint as to both the information-gathering and dissemination, holding that such activities did not give rise to a
91. [d. at 1319. The litigation has proceeded, with the most important developments
revolving around a May 31, 1977 Order by District Judge Griesa that the government release
to the plaintiffs files on eighteen informers. The propriety of the Order was affirmed by the
court of appeals, In re United States, 565 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom., Bell
v. Socialist Workers Party, 98 S.Ct. 3082 (1978). When Attorney General Griffin Bell failed
to comply with the Order, he was adjudged in civil contempt. Socialist Workers Party v.
Attorney General, No. 73-3160 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 1978). The Second Circuit stayed the order,
pending appeal, No. 78·6114 (2d Cir. July 7, 1978) (bench opinion).
92. 387 F. Supp. at 754.
93. 510 F.2d at 256.
94. Note, Police Undercover Agents: New Threat to First Amendment Freedoms, 37
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 634, 640 (1969).
95. 519 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1975).
96. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).
97. 519 F.2d at 1336.
98. [d. at 1337.
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"specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future
harm"-the test of Tatum. 99 The Third Circuit concurred with the
district court's decision about the information gathering, and dissemination of information to "other agencies of government having
a legitimate law enforcement function."loo The Third Circuit found,
however, that the other allegations as to the uses and disclosures of
the gathered information were "sufficient to withstand a motion to
dismiss,"lol since it concluded, "no safeguards exist on the disposition of or access to the political and personal information and conclusions contained in the dossiers . . . . "102 The Third Circuit found
that "since it [was] alleged that plaintiffs [were] subject to surveillance only because their political views deviate[d] from those
of the· 'establishment'," the allegations showed "immediately
threatened injury"-such as interference with "job opportunities,
careers or travel rights."103 It is not clear from the court's opinion,
however, why these same injuries were not equally threatened by
the uncontrolled gathering and exchange of information among law
enforcement agencies.
The Third Circuit further distinguished between the
"subjective complaints" of Tatum and plaintiffs' complaint, in
Tate, of television disclosure, which, "although not concrete, [was]
nonetheless strikingly apparent."104 The appellate court found that
this public identification of surveillance subjects, coupled "with the
absence of a lawful purpose" warranted a grant of standing to the
Tate plaintiffs. l05 The Third Circuit concluded:
We are unwilling to say that the Supreme Court in Tatum
intended to leave our citizens judicially remediless against
the types of police action discussed. If plaintiffs' allegations are true, this type of activity strikes at the heart of a
free society. 106
It appears that, but for the court's feeling that Tatum directly

controlled intra-police exchange of intelligence, at least portions of
the allegations would also have been sufficient to warrant standing.
In Tate, as in Socialist Workers Party, the plaintiffs remained in
99. 382 F. Supp. 547, 549 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
100. 519 F.2d at 1338.
101. [d.
102. [d.
103. [d.
104. [d.
105. [d. See also Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975) (plaintiff found to have
standing to seek both expungement of her files and damages against the FBI).
106. [d.
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court to determine the merits of the case; standing had been established, apparently by the court's approach to the cases from the
"rights" end of the spectrum. The court in Tate made clear that it
was "not called upon to express an opinion as to the compatibility
of such [police] practice with desirable standards under our political form of government."107
The third case, White v. Davis, 108 discussed fully and vigorously
supported first amendment values in a discrete context of political
intelligence. In White, a V.C.L.A. professor challenged the Los Angeles Chief of Police, and others, in a taxpayer's suit "to enjoin the
alleged illegal expenditure of public funds in connection with the
police department's conduct of covert intelligence gathering activities at V.C.L.A."IOU The complaint alleged that secret informers and
undercover agents had registered as students at V.C.L.A., attended
classes, and submitted reports of discussions occurring in those
classes. If0 It was also alleged that "undercover police agents have
joined university-recognized organizations, and have made reports
on discussions at such meetings."1II The materials gathered, the
complaint stated, "pertain to no illegal activity or acts."112
The trial court sustained defendants' demurrer ll3 and the case,
like others dealing with police surveillance, was appealled on the
pleadings. The California Supreme Court clearly indicated its basis
for reversal of the demurrer. First, the court held that "[t]he allegations of the complaint state a prima facie violation of freedom of
speech and assembly as well as of the state constitutional right of
privacy."114 Second, in addressing the issue of standing, the court
rejected that applicability of Laird v. Tatum,1I5 finding that under
the California Code of Civil Procedure ll6 the use of a taxpayer's suit
"as a means of challenging the legality of ongoing police investiga107. [d. at 1336.
108. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975).
109. [d. at 762, 553 P.2d at 225, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
110. [d.
111. [d.
112. [d.
113. [d.
114. [d. at 760,533 P.2d at 224, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
115. [d. at 763-65,533 P.2d at 226-27,120 Cal. Rptr. at 98-99. The surveillance activities
at issue in White had been raised previously in the federal court, but dismissed on the same
narrow doctrine of federal justiciability articulated in Tatum. [d. at 763, 533 P.2d at 226, 120
Cal. Rptr. at 98. See Bagley v. City of Los Angeles, No. 71-166-JWC (C.D. Cal. 1971).
116. 13 Cal. 3d at 763, 533 P.2d at 225, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 97, quoting CAL. CIV. PRoe.
CODE § 526 (a) (West 1977): "An action to obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing any
illegal expenditure of . . . funds . . . of a county, town, city or city and county of the state
may be maintained against any officer thereof. . . by a citizen resident therein. . . ." [d.
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tory activities has a long and firmly established heritage in this
state."lI7
The California Supreme Court felt that Tatum was decided on
"a restrictive federal doctrine of justiciability." us In stating the first
amendment test by which it would measure plaintiff's allegations,
the court decided that "in light of this potentially grave threat to
freedom of expression,. . . the government bearS the responsibility
of demonstrating a compelling state interest which justifies such
impingement and of showing that its purposes cannot be achieved
by less restrictive means."UB The California Supreme Court, like the
trial court in Anderson, placed first amendment values in a
"preferred position"-a view from the "rights" ~nd of the spectrum,
requiring (a) a close "nexus" between the government's means and
ends, (b) a compelling state interest, and (c) the least restrictive
means to "justify such impingement."12o
In White, the California Supreme Court's approach from the
"rights" end of the rights-security spectrum resulted in a skeptical
view of police surveillance, with the court concluding: "[W]e visualize a substantial probability that this alleged covert police surveillance will chill the exercise of First Amendment rightS."121 The defendants' contention that such activity was to "enable the police to
anticipate and perhaps prevent future criminal activity"122 did not
sway the court:
Although the police unquestionably pursue a legitimate
interest in gathering information to forestall future criminal acts, the identification of that legitimate interest is just
the beginning point of analysis in this case, not, as defendant suggests, the conclusion. The inherent legitimacy of
the police 'intelligence gathering' functions does not grant
the police the unbridled power to pursue that function by
any and all means. In this realm, as in all others, the permissible limits of governmental action are circumscribed by
the Federal Bill of Rights . . . .123
The court continued with a discussion of first amendment
117. 13 Cal. 3d at 763, 533 P.2d at 225-26, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 97-98, citing, Wirin v.
Parker, 48 Cal. 2d 890, 313 P.2d 844 (1957), and Wirin v. Horrall, 85 Cal. App. 497,193 P.2d
470 (1948). Both of these cases involved allegedly unconstitutional police practices.
118. 13 Cal. 3d at 764, 533 P.2d at 227, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
119. [d. at 761, 533 P.2d at 224, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
120. [d.
121. [d.
122. [d. at 766, 533 P.2d at 227, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
123. [d. at 766, 533 P.2d 227-28, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 99-100.
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rights and· values in relation to "ongoing police surveillance of a
university community," noting that surveillance would "inevitably
inhibit" free expression by both students and professors, and remanded the case for a trial on the merits. 124 .
The foregoing discussion of judicial consideration of police spy
litigation reveals two interrelated theories. First, the outcome of
such lltigation, at least concerning justiciability and standing, is
dependent upon that end of the rights-security spectrum from
which the court chooses to approach the matter. Second, the courts
have not readily accepted plaintiffs' arguments of a "specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm"125 resulting
from political surveillance activities. It is hoped that the empirical
study and analysis which follow will provide a basis upon which to
determine the "harm" of such surveillance activities, or that it will
at least show evidence of intelligence-gathering by which the courts
will be prompted to lean more towards the "rights" end of the
rights-security spectrum in their initial analysis of police spy litigation.

m.

STUDY SAMPLE

A.

Obtaining the documents
In the course of discovery in Benkert v. Michigan State
Police, 126 a significant quantity of files, documents, and other materials were obtained from the Detroit Police Department's Reconnaissance Unit. These materials, relating to ten of the fourteen
named plaintiffs in Benkert, make up the following study sample. l21
124.
12~.

[d. at 772, 533 P.2d at 232, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 104.

Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 14 (1972).
126. No. 74-023-934-AZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct., Mich., filed July 26, 1974). See text
accompanying notes 8-18 supra.
127. The ten Benkert plaintiffs, whose Detroit Police Files compose the study sample,
have each been assigned a letter of the alphabet for easy reference in this article. The assignation is as follows: Janet Goldwasser (A); Stuart Dowty (B); Bonnie Garvin Lafferty (Cl;
Selma Goode (D); The Fifth Estate (newspaper) (E); Abdeen Jabara (F); James B. Jacobs
(G); James T. Lafferty (H); Michigan Assoc. for Consumer Protection (I); and Peter Werbe
(J). The letters K through Z will be used to refer to those targets whose identity is still
protected under the Modified Protective Order, infra note 128.
In this Article, references to specific pages in the Detroit Police Files concerning an
identified target (e.g., Target E) often are followed by a coded parenthetical indicating the
part of the target's file in which the information is found (e.g. Detroit Police Files, Target E,
at 150 (MIC». These codes indicate either the Master Index Card file system (MICl, the
Intelligence Exchange Card System (IE), or the dossier file system (no parenthetical). The
term "file," as employed in this Article, includes all index systems, dossiers, and other
materials in the Detroit Police materials which can be referenced to a particular target (i.e.,
an individual, organization, or event) [hereinafter cited as Detroit Police Files).
In determining the pagination of a particular target's file, for purposes of this Article,
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The materials were originally obtained under a strict protective
order,l28 which was subsequently modified to allow substantial portions of the materials to be used without limitation. 129 The limited
protection still in effect is that the "named plaintiffs . . . [may]
disseminate and use without limitation all information [contained
in their files] so long as that information does not name or identify
third parties. . . who have been included in these files and materials as a result of the activities of defendants . . . . "130
The purpose of this section is to organize and interpret these
files and materials in a way that might provide evidence to help
explain political intelligence gathering; to analyze this evidence to
determine what presumptions and generaliz~tions made by the
courts concerning such police activity are justified; and to then pose
for consideration certain principles and presumptions that should
govern the resolution of first amendment concerns and dilemmas
involved in this type of activity.
A number of research caveats should be noted at the outset.
First, the plaintiffs were not selected in a random fashion and,
therefore, are not necessarily statistically representative of all persons and organizations included in the Detroit Police subversive
files. The plaintiffs are, however, sufficiently representative of all
surveillance targets to have been certified by the court as proper
representatives of a class consisting of all persons or organizations
who have been, are currently being, or will be investigated by the
subversive units of the Michigan State Police and Detroit Police
Department. 131
As a necessary corollary, therefore, the study sample materials
are not necessarily completely representative of all materials maineach written side of a sheet of paper or file card is designated as a separate page. Thus, a
reference to Detroit Police Files, Target E, at 2 (IE), indicates that the cited information will
be found on the second side of the Intelligence Exchange Card maintained by the Detroit
Police on Target E. In addition to 747 pages of study sample material disclosed in Benkert,
many copies of leaflets and other mass-distributed material do not require specific referencing
and, therefore, are not included in this pagination system.
It should be noted that the Detroit Police Department has denied maintaining any
Subversive Unit files on four of the Benkert plaintiffs: Walter Benkert, Sterling Maxfield,
Lee Gayer, and Cornelius Norwood. At this time it is impossible to ascertain the validity of
this assertion.
128. See Protective Order, Benkert v. Michigan State Police, No. 74-023-934-AZ
(Wayne County Cir. Ct., Mich., entered orally May 2, 1975).
129. See Order Granting In Part and Denying In Part Motion for Modification of Protective Order, Benkert v. Michigan State Police, No. 74-023-934-AZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct.,
Mich., entered Oct. 10, 1975) [hereinafter referred to as Modified Protective Order].
130. [d.
131. See Order Certifying Class Action, Benkert v. Michigan State Police, No. 74-023934-AZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct., Mich., filed Dec. 26, 1975).
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tained by the police subversive unit. 132 Examination of additional
files, however, has revealed that the study sample materials are
typical of those present in most subversive files. There is, therefore,
some substantial verification that the study sample is representative of all the Michigan State Police and Detroit Police Department
subversive files.
In addition to the study sample materials, other files and documents, mentioned above, have been examined, but were excluded
from the study sample because still protected under the court's
order.l33 Also, the court ordered the city of Detroit defendants to
disclose all "index cards, file cards, I.E. cards and files pertaining
to the named plaintiffs. . . and all other files and documents pertaining to those persons and organizations in [their] possession
. . . ,"134 but at least four additional filing systems containing information about the Benkert plaintiffs were revealed but not disclosed
in the course of discovery.135 The materials in those additional filing
systems are still under the court's protective order, and therefore
cannot be included in the study sample.
In addition, there is presently no means of determining whether
additional filing systems or materials exist, but remain undiscovered. The study sample and analysis is, therefore, only a first effort
at an in-depth consideration of a limited amount of materials from
political surveillance files. Nevertheless, it is sufficient material to
132. In addition to the production under court order of the materials making up the
study sample, substantial additional discovery, has occurred in the Benkert case. Depositions
were taken of police officers who are, or were recently, with the Subversive Unit, and thousands of pages contained in files and dossiers on individuals and organizations were examined
under the Modified Protective Order, supra note 128.
133. See note 14 supra. The Modified Protective Order, supra note 129, released from
the original order the files concerning the named plaintiffs in Benkert, but denied plaintiffs'
motion to also release all materials concerning "consenting third parties." General concepts
and information that have been developed and obtained as a result of this discovery process
are inevitably included throughout this Article.
134. See Order to Produce Documents for Inspection and Copying, Benkert v. Michigan
State Police, No. 74-023-934-AZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct., Mich., entered May 9, 1975). See
also note 127 supra.
135. The four additional filing systems that have been isolated are designated by the
city as: (1) the picture or photograph file, which may also include videotapes and motion
pictures, and has been admitted to exist; (2) the demonstration file, which is apparently a
chronological indexing and recording of all public demonstrations that have occurred in the
city, as well as a number of other "events" that the police determine merit surveillance, many
of which have involved the primary targets; (3) the source file, which is apparently a filing
systerh in which the original reports or written information submitted by all informants and
undercover agents concerning individuals and' organizations are kept according to a coded
numerical informant or undercover agent designation; and (4) the surveillance file, which is
a chronological file of logs turned in by police officers of the Subversive Unit assigned to
surveillance duty, which may involve a stationary or a moving surveillance of a particular
individual, location, or event.
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provide significant insights into the nature of police political spying
apparatus. Although the study sample embraces only subversive
files from the Detroit Police Department, there is evidence to believe that many local subversive units operate in similar ways.136
The few writings available on police intelligence units, and the various techniques they employ, seem to reveal a basic outline or program similar to that pursued by the Detroit Police Department-at
least from 1963 to 1974, which is the time span covered by the study
sample. '37 This provides further support for the value of the study
sample analysis beyond the locale out of which it arose.

B.

Physical Description
The compilation of materials which constitute a target's "file"
has three categories, each of which is apparently maintained in a
physically separate filing system. l38 The three categories or types of
material are: Master Index Cards, Intelligence Evaluation or Intelligence Exchange Cards (I.E. Cards), and Dossiers. Including all
these types of documents, the study sample contained a total of 747
pages, 116 pages of Master Index Cards, 26 pages of I.E. Cards, and
605 pages of dossier material. In addition, the dossiers contained a
significant number of publicly distributed documents, which were
not counted as pages of the study sample. '39
1.

Master Index Cards

The Master Index Card, a conventional four-by-six card, appears to form the basis of the primary name filing system. In some
instances, these cards have had certain information categories
printed on them. Often a target will have more than one Index Card
in the set of cards relating to it, in which case the cards are consecutively numbered. Some files contain two separate sets of Index
Cards, apparently due to the fact that the Detroit Police had two
136. Discovery in Benkert revealed numerous references to similar material contained
in, or received from, local law enforcement agencies in Michigan, and some references to outof-state police departments as sources of information gathered by the Michigan State Police.
137. See SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, INTELLIGENCE AcTIVmES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, BOOK II, S. REP. No. 94-755, 94th Congo 2d Sess. (1976);
CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE IRON FIsT AND THE VELVET GLOVE: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE U.S. POLICE (2d ed. 1977); A. BOUZA, POLICE INTELLIGENCE: THE OPERATIONS OF AN
INVESTIGATIVE UNIT (1976).
138. See Detroit Police Files, supra note 127.
139. Most of these additional documents are leaflets, brochures, and other handouts
publicly distributed by various political organizations. In addition, the files contained entire
copies of many newspapers of political organizations and papers characterized as
"underground" or "alternative press." For example, target E, supra note 127, was a newspaper, and its file included almost a complete set of the paper for the past few years.
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separate details engaged in political intelligence gathering during
the late 1960's.l40
The face card in a Master Index Card set contains primarily
personal or organization information, and subsequent cards in a set
contain activity entries. 141 Changes in personal information-particularly address, phone number, and employment-are
regularly entered on the cards, but the main purpose of the Master
Index set seems to be exactly as its name implies-a master index
to all activities of a target individual or organization, with references to where more-detailed information can be found.
2. Intelligence Exchange Cards
The Intelligence Exchange (I.E.) Card is another summary
index of a target's history and activities. These cards are approximately eight and one-half by ten inches, with a fold in the middle
for filing. One or more photographs are often included on the
cards. 142
The entries on the I.E. Cards are similar in nature to and sometimes duplicate the entries on the Master Index Cards. As with the
Master Index Cards, an individual or organization has often had two
or more I.E. Cards in a set, which would be numbered consecutively
and stapled together.
The I.E. Cards are apparently a newer index form used by one
of the two subversive units of the Detroit Police whenever a target
appeared more than a few times in the subversive files. When the
two units merged in 1970, the I.E. Cards were retained. 143
Chart No.1 indicates the number of Master Index (MIC) and
I.E. Card (IE) pages for the 10 targets of the study sample.
140. See Detroit News, Sept. 4, 1975, at lA, col. 2. In the 1930's, the Detroit Police
created a "subversive detail." After the 1967 Detroit riots, a second unit, the "security
detail," was created to surveil political protest groups. See also L. Loukopoulos, The Detroit
Police Department: A Research for the Committee on Public Awareness (May 1970) (unpub·
lished report in Wayne St. Univ. L. Sch. Lib.). Depositions of police officers in Benkert
confirmed the existence of these two separate units, but any further discussion is precluded
by the Modified Protective Order, supra note 129.
141. See Note 156 & accompanying text infra.
142. A detailed exploration of the photographing, videotaping, and filming activities of
the Subversive Unit is beyond the scope of this Article, since these materials were not in·
cluded in the study sample. It is interesting to note, however, that many of the targets of the
Police files have never been arrested or otherwise subjected to known police photography. It
appears, therefore, that the Detroit Police obtain photographs surreptitiously from a variety
of sources. For example, Abdeen Jabara, target F, indicated in an interview with the author,
on June 1, 1975, that the two photographs included in his file were (1) a photograph furnished
to a local bar association for an attorney registry and (2) a photograph submitted for passport
renewal some years ago.
143. See Deposition of Stanley Perich, at 7, Benkert v. Michigan State Police, No. 74·
023·934-AZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct., Michigan., taken Nov. 18, 1975).

POLICE SURVEILLANCE

1978]

Target
MIC

IE

Total
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A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

Total
P.ages

13

18

25

2

16

no
(MIC)

7

2

2

31

116

5

4

1

2

223

3

no
(IE)

3

25

18

22

26

4

5

2

34

141

18

2

10

CHART NO.1

3. Dossiers
The third type of documentary compilation in the study sample
is the dossier; one or more eight-by-eleven-inch folders labelled with
a designation of the target individual or organization by name, code
number, or both. The primary police-prepared documents contained in a dossier are called "Detroit Police Department InterOffice Memorandum."144 These vary in length-the longest in the
study sample containing ten pages-and are always signed by at
least one, and often two, police officers and a police supervisor who
.
has "read and approved" the report.145
The dossiers also contain appropriately labelled and dated originals or copies of newspaper and magazine clippings, including letters to the editor!46 In addition, the dossiers contained a variety of
additional documents printed or distributed by the target or someone associated therewith, including: publicly distributed literature;147 leaflets;148 and organizational position papers Jintended for
limited private distribution such as agendas, rosters, and treasurers'
reports. 149 The dossiers also contained various documents from other
government agencies-law enforcement and otherwise-which relate to the target, an associate or relative thereof, or an organization
to which one of those individuals allegedly belonged. 150 A number of
144. City of Detroit Forms D-77-ME and DPD 568 (12-63).
145. A sample of this document, and the accompanying signatures, is contained in

Appendix C of this Article.
146. See text accompanying notes 195-200 infra.
147. See, e.g., Detroit Police Files, supra note 127, Target E, at 164 (underground
newspaper) & Target C, at 131 (mass mailing).
148. See, e.g., id. Target E, at 171 (leaflet announcing anti-war demonstration).
149. See, e.g., id. Target C, at 51, 59 (invitations to organizational meetings) 70 (internal proposal).
.
150. See, e.g., id. Target E, at 197, 203 (articles of incorporation and annual ~eport of
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organizational mailing and membership lists, usually provided by
a "confidential source," were also found in the dossiers of the study
sample. 151
The majority of pages constituting the study sample were from
non public sources, since publicly distributed leaflets, newspapers,
and other documents were excluded from the study sample pagination. 152 The Master Index and I.E. cards, none of which is from
public sources, account for 141 pages of the study sample. The bulk
of the remaining 606 pages of the study sample were documents
prepared by police officers and other government agencies, or by the
surveillance targets for private use. For example, there were fiftyseven different police memoranda in the dossiers of the study sampIe, one dossier containing twenty-two such memoranda.
Other police-prepared documents in the dossiers include teletype requests for information on the targets, often accompanied by
a teletype response. 153 Documents prepared or furnished by other
police departments or other government agencies also appeared in
the dossiers. In some instances, the Detroit Police Department
Memoranda, the basic police-prepared document in the dossiers, 154
specifically indicated that the Michigan State Police supplied or
participated in gathering the information entered. 155
C. Typical Examples of Information Gathered

1.

Introduction

An examination of some representative examples of the information contained in the various types of documents in the study
sample illustrates the range of activity and concerns recorded by the
police department, and the techniques employed to gather that information.
As noted earlier in Chart No.1, there were 116 pages (or sides)
of Master Index Cards and 25 pages of I.E. Cards, each containing
entries of a similar nature. In most cases, the face card (Master
Index or I.E.) included the following information: name; aliases;
nonprofit corporation); Target J, at 364-71 (application for permit to carry a concealed
weapon), 426 (marriage license).
151. See, e.g., id. Target at 204 (first page of 24-pagemailinglist);TargetC.at 94
("contact list" of political organization).
152. As discussed earlier, Detroit Police Files, supra note 127, the Master Index and
Intelligence Exchange Cards are included in the sample study pages. See also note 138 &
accompanying text, supra.
153. See, e.g., Detroit Police Files, supra note 127; Target J, at 363; Target C, at 142.
154. Full reports from the Michigan State Police, FBI and other state and local police
agencies appear frequently in a number of files examined, but are not included in the study
sample because they are still under the Modified Protective Order, supra note 129.
155. See, e.g., Detroit Police Files, supra note 127, Target C, at 98, 109.
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former and present home and business addresses and phone numbers; date of birth; brief physical description; automobile license
and registration information; employment information; family information; FBI number (if one existed); and similar identifying,
locating, and historical information. 156 The cards following the face
card in a given Master Index or I.E. card set included very little of
this basic information, including only name and activity or surveillance entries. Often, the face cards also contained activity or surveillance entries, but there is only room for a few such entries under
the basic information entered. As can be seen in Chart No.2, in the
study sample there were 329 activity entries on the Master Index
Cards, and 258 such entries on the I.E. Cards. 157 The number of
entries on a single Master Index Card ranged from 0 to 122, while
the entries on a single I.E. Card ranged from 0 to 67. The study
sample contained relatively few instances where activity entries
were duplicated between the two index card systems.
Target

?rIIC

Total
A

B

C

D

E

17

34

87

4

30

J

Entries

3

122

329

F

G

H

I

no

24

8

?rIIC

IE

38

67

4

4

13

9

25

40

no
IE

58

258

Total

56

105

97

9

43

9

49

48

3

180

587

CHART NO.2

The examination of the study sample materials will proceed by
identifying certain basic categories of information gathered, and
then provide examples of the entries followed by explanatory comments.

2. Personal History Items
1. 1958 subj. graduated from Mumford High sch. Former
add: -Mifflin Avenue., Lansing, Mich. 158
2. 1963, Sept., subj. registered for the Fall Semester at
Wayne State University Liberal Art Student. 159
156.
157.
158.
159.

See Appendices A and B.
See note 157 & accompanying text supra.
Detroit Police Files, supra note 127, Target J, at 338 (MIC).
[d.
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3. July 10, 1967, Mr. K. called above phone number and
learned that J and his wife reside at the above address. A
female who identified herself as SUE answered the phone
and indicated that she was J's sister.160
4. 3-5-70 Checking Bressers, subj. gave same address and
phone number at-Coplin as a X same address, Also Det.
Edison has subject still living at-Coplin. 161
5. 9-6-72 subj. now lives at -York, -Twps, with his wife
M, W, X, Y, and Z per 142.162
6. 3-6-74 Subj. was divorced from his wife P. Subj. was
Plaintiff case No: 73 _.163
7. 1974 Subj. is suppose [sic] to be married to C per
source info. 164
The form of the above entries-a date followed by short
phrases-is typical of almost all the Master Index and I.E. Card
entries. In some instances, however, there were long single-spaced
entries covering as much as three index cards. 165 The index card
entries are never signed or initialed, and therefore there is no means
of identifying, from the cards alone, who in the police department
made or authorized the entry. In some instances the entries refer,
or correspond, to one or more documents in the dossier of the target
or of another subject. In other cases, however, the items on the
Master Index and I.E. Cards appear to stand alone.
In terms of content, the first set of entries on all the Master
Index and I.E. Cards, or on the face card of a set of cards, contain
a substantial amount of personal history information which, if
needed, is updated by chronological data entries, rather than by
amending the original entries. As with all entries on the index cards,
only occasionally has a source been referenced. In entry 5, for example, "per 142" is a reference to a police informant, undercover agent,
or confidential source of the information entered, whose code designation is "142." In entry 4, Detroit Edison obviously provided some
information. The use of elaborate source referencing is clearly indicated by other entries on documents in the study sample and will
160. [d. 350 (MIC).

161. [d. Target G, at 255 (IE), 263 (MIC).
162. [d., Target J, at 330 (IE). The reference "per 142" in this item indicates the
informant or undercover agent who provided the entered data.
163. [d. Target H, at 251 (IE).
164. [d.
165. See, e.g., id. Target E, at 157; Target G, at 259 (containing summaries of newspaper articles concerning the target or an organization with which the target associates). See
also id. Target E, at 147-48 (lengthy entry of a list identifying individuals on underground
newspaper editorial staff).
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be fully explored in a subsequent section of this Article which deals
with cross-referencing.

3. Employment
8. 1967, employed as ass't instructor, Department of Political Science, MSU, East Lansing, Michigan. 166
9. 10-20-70 Issue of [community college paper] states
that subject has been fired from his teaching job at MCCC
[Macomb County Community College).167
10. 1971 Subj. reported to be a part-time employee at
Main Library. 168
11. 11-13-71 Surv. Crew Obs subj's wife pick him up at
work and then go to-Cass [food market], and from there
they drove to-Grand River. 169
12. 3-9-72 Subj. resigned from Warren Truck Plant.17°
13. 10-28-72 Subj. has a talk show (RADIO) called
NIGHT CALL, Station WRIF, 101. FM, 3:30-4:30 A.M.,
Phone number 345- WRIF. Guest speaker this night was
[X]. Subjs. talked about [3 political organizations].171
14. 6-73 Secretary at WCCC [Wayne County Community
College] .172
15. 7-9-73 Subj. now works as a news broadcaster for
WPON, a radio station in Pontiac. 173
16. Works for Florist Trans-World Delivery,-Lafayette
St.174
17. 10-1-73 From source 142 subj. resides at-Gratiot, Mt.
Clemens. Also subj. was fired from newspaper for a radical
article. Believe he no longer teaches.175
Most of the.files in the study sample contain employment entries. Often more than one is included as a target changes employment. These employment entries are often joined with other personal history information, although sometimes they are alone.
Historically, there is no question that the accumulation of political intelligence information concerning citizens was primarily for
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

Target B,
Target G,
Target C,
Target B,

at 215 (MIC).
at 255 (IE).
at 5 (MIC).
at 208 (IE).

Target A, at 231 (IE).
Target C, at 21 (MIC).
Target G, at 255 (IE).
Target J, at 330 (IE).
Target A, at 231 (IE).
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the purpose of monitoring and influencing employment l76 and that
the intended effect was the denial or termination of employment of
"subversives." In 1950, when the Michigan Legislature authorized
the Commissioner of the Michgan State Police to create a Subversive Activities Investigation Division,177 the release of any confidential information accumulated by that unit on matters "subversive
of government" was made a felony, but it was specifically provided
"that the commissioner may furnish information. . . to responsible
heads of any agency having charge of employment by the
state . . . . "17S Additionally, the Communist Control Act, or
"Trucks Act," was adopted by the Michigan Legislature in 1952,179
following other states which had mimicked the federal communistcontrol legislation passed in 1950. This act was also concerned with
the employment of alleged "subversives." Hence, the Michigan
State Police became very active in surveillance of political activity
during the 1950's. ISO
Although most provisions of the Trucks Act were declared invalid by virtue of the federal preemption in Albertson v. Attorney
General, lSI still in effect was the section providing that:
No person may hold any non-elected position, job or office
for the State of Michigan, or any political subdivision
thereof . . . where reasonable grounds exist, on all the evidence, from which . . . the employer or superior of such
person can say with reasonable certainty that such person
176. For a discussion of Detroit politics, see J. GREENSTONE, LABOR IN AMERICAN
POUTICS, 110-31 (1969). See generally, J. JENSEN, THE PRICE OF VIGILANCE (1968); A. NEVINS,
FORD: THE TIMES, THE MAN, THE COMPANY (1954).
177. MICH. COMPo LAWS §§ 28.51-28.56 (1970).
178. Id. § 28.53.
179. MICH. COMPo LAWS §§ 752.321-757.332 (1970).
180. 1953 Michigan State Police Report, at 42. See also 1959 Michigan State Police
Report; Donner, The Theory and Practice of American Political Intelligence, NEW YORK REV.
OF BOOKS, April 27, 1971, at 27. Mr. Donner quotes at length from the 1969 Annual Report of
the Massachusuetts State Police Division of Subversive Activity, wherein it is indicated that
along with a wide range of governmental agencies, "industrial plants and educational institutions now clear with this division on security checks." Id.
181. 345 Mich. 519, 77 N.W.2d 104 (1956). Albertson declared sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7
of the Michigan Communist Control Law, MICH. COMPo LAWS §§ 752.321-32 (1970) (The
Trucks Act), preempted by federal legislation and, therefore, unenforceable. Sections 1, 6,
and 8 of the law were not challenged in that case and, therefore, were left unaffected.
Albertson was decided six weeks after the United States Supreme Court, in Pennsylvania V.
Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), declared certain provisions of the Pennsylvania Sedition Act
superceded by federal legislation. In Albertson V. Millard, 106 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Mich.
1952), an earlier attempt to have the Trucks Act declared unconstitutonal was unsuccessful.
See also Comment, The Present Status of Michigan Anti-Subversion Legislation, 2 WAYNE
L. REv. 221 (1956).
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is a Communist or a knowing member of a Communist front
organization. 182
The Michigan State Police and other police departments were still
concerned with efforts to infiltrate the educational field, defense
plants, labor, civic, state, and other organizations, and continued
their surveillance of political activity.183 It now appears, however,
that concern with "subversives" extended far beyond the statutory
mandate concerning governmental employment.

4. Accumulation of Names
18. The following were recognized as taking part in the
anti-war Sing Along Demonstration: [26 names]. Also
present was [X's] mother, name unknown. 184
19. The following were recognized as being in attendance
at this meeting: [list of names] .185
20. The following is a registration of vehicles observed in
the immediate area of the meeting: [list of automobiles
including license number, year and make, followed by
names and addresses, purported the registered owners of
the vehicle].186
It is apparent now that the primary concern of political information gathering is the listing of names of all persons possibly involved or associated with any target or activity that is under surveillance. Within the study sample, this effort to associate as many
individuals as possible with as many organizations and occurences
as possible has resulted in specific references, by name, to over 150
different organizations. 187 As revealed by the documents in the study
sample, a person's name may appear in a list of the subversive unit
in a number of ways. First, various organizations and their meetings
were regularly monitored. At the conclusion of the reports of these
meetings appeared a list of persons identified as being in attendance. 188 Second, certain events or activities, chosen by police be182.
183.
184.
185.

MICH. COMPo LAWS § 752.328 (1970).
1956 Michigan State Police Report.
Detroit Police Files, supra note 126, Target C, at 25.

Forty of the fifty-seven police reports in the study sample contained such attendance lists, with three to sixty-five entries included therein.
186. Twenty of the fifty-seven police reports in the study sample included such license
plate lists. The lists ranged from three to eighty-one entries.
187. Because the organizations referred to in the study sample are often indicated by
initials, many sets being similar and, therefore, confusing, it is impossible to determine the
exact number of organizations reported in the study sample, without conducting extensive
interviews and investigations, which is beyond the scope of this Article. The estimate of 150
is conservative.
188. The dossiers of the primary targets contained many police reports focusing on
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cause of their political nature or sponsor, were monitored. In the
case of public demonstrations or events, subversive unit officers, or
their informers, would be in attendance and file reports-again,
with a list of persons identified at the 'event. These lists included
the names of individuals in attendance, regardless of whether they
were members of the sponsoring organization of an event that would
otherwise have prompted the subversive unit's surveillance. IH9
A third means of gathering names was by observing vehicles in
various locations, or in the vicinity of various activities, and recording and checking the registrations of the vehicles observed. Organizational offices, meeting places, functions, and persons' homes were
the primary focus for this type of police activity. On a few occasions
the police reports indicated that police actually observed the named
individual leaving the observed vehicle,19o but in most cases, it is
clear that the names listed were merely the result of obtaining registration information. 191 In this way, persons not at a monitored event
would have their name appear in subversive unit reports if their
vehicle was parked in the vicinity of an event or activity under
surveillance. Persons attending merely as observers, and not participants, were named on a police list, without distinction.
Often, names of persons were also obtained by the subversive
unit from leaflets or other publically distributed documents of an
organization or of organizers of an event under surveillance. 192 The
names of announced speakers at such events were listed by police,
regardless of whether the speaker actually appeared. 193 Thus, errors
in preparation of leaflets or event agendas, and changes in plans
were often unrecognized in the police lists. Names were also listed
in the subversive files if they appeared in any periodical or newspaper issued by political dissenters. Indeed, detailed files were maintained on dissenting periodicals-one of which became a plaintiff in
Benkert. 194 Another prevalent police practice appearing in the files
particular meetings or activities of certain organizations, and contained therewith a list of
individuals in attendance.
189. For example, one's name might be discovered on lists entitled: Identification of
Persons Taking Part in Anti-War Demonstration at the Federal Building, Sponsored by
[name of organization or individual]; or Anti-War and Free Angela Davis March and Rally.
190. See, e.g., Detroit Police Files, supra note 127, Target C, at 100. "This subject was
observed driving the vehicle with Minnesota license plates listed below. X was observed being
transported in this vehicle. . . ." [d.
19!. See, e.g., id. Target J, at 378. This report states: "[T]he following is a registration
of vehicles parked in the immediate area of police headquarters. Occupants took part in the
demonstration." [d.
192. See note 139 supra.
193. Interviews with Targets A, B, F, H, and J, Detroit Police Files supra note 127,
conducted May 1975.
194. Target E, supra note 127, is such a newspaper. See note 139 supra.
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of the study sample was the inclusion in the dossiers of letters to the
editor and other articles from major metropolitan newspapers. The
letters and articles collected were those expressing views critical of
government policy, but never dealing with proposed action. For
example:
21. The U. S. walkout on the Paris peace talks proves once
again that Nixon has no intention of ending U. S. involvement in Southeast Asia. During the entire time we were
supposedly negotiating a settlement, 100 tons of bombs
were dropped each hour on the Indochinese people. By the
end of this month, the U. S. will have dropped as many
bombs on Vietnam as were dropped in all of 1971.
Our representative, William Porter, says that the U.S. 'Yill
not return to the talks until the Vietnamese decide to negotiate "seriously". But if we were serious, we would not even
be there. We have nothing to negotiate; we need only to
withdraw all troops and material from Indochina now. That
is the only serious way to end the war.
[Target C and another]195
22. When Tricky Dick tells us the cure for the imbalance
of dollars will balance out with the surtax on all foreign
goods, we are again being led deeper into disaster. When
the foreign countries are forced to do the same to our goods,
what has the world got but a depression that will make the
30's look like fun?
What we should realize is the cost of Vietnam alone with
the cost of maintaining an Army all over the world is what
is leaving our money there instead of here. The answer is
to cut back on the military and end the war now.
X [Mother of Target Cp96
23. To the small businessman: Aren't you offended when
Mr. Connolly appears on TV and states "interest rates
don't have to be frozen, they're at an all time low"? Bank
interest rates are at 9V2% Either he thinks the public is a
pack of idiots or he is.
X [Mother of Target C] 197
Other examples, too lengthy to present here, are headlines:
195. Detroit Police Files, supra note 127, Target C, at 49.
196. Id.83.
197. ld. 84.
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"Bombing Violence Compared";198 "Wallace, A Racist Demagog"; 199
and "Failure to Represent, "200 criticizing a Michigan State Senator.
N ames also appeared in the police files through police examination of other government files in which names are listed for nonpolice purposes. For example, articles of incorporation, assumed name
files, bar association records, applications of various sorts, occupational licensing files, and the like, appear to have provided names
for the subversive unit. In checking an individual or organization
whose name has come to police attention, the police examination of
public documents has often resulted in the names of people associated with the target being included in the police report. For example, stockholders appearing on corporate papers filed with the Secretary of the Treasury; 201 parents, parties, and attendants at weddings whose names appear on a marriage license;202 and references
acknowledged on gun permits,203 may find their names, and possibly
their own dossiers, in the police subversive files.

5.

Organizational Lists

24. April 1967 Subj. listed as member of the [political
organization]. From Extremely Confidential Source. 204
25. 1968, File 3396, RADICALS IN PROFESSIONS
CONFERENCE, is alleged to have taken place. See file for
confidential list obtained from 009, people who attended,
listed according to interest. (It appears to be a list ofProfessions engaged in the radicalleft.)205
26. Oct. 1970, file 509. Subj. name appears on confidential
198. Id. 38. This letter, in the Detroit News on May 15, 1972, challenged the editorial
position opposing student disorder on campuses while supporting "indiscriminate terror
bombing" in Vietnam.
199. Id. Target C, at 44. This letter was included in the target's file even though it was
written by the target's father.
200.. Id. 96. This letter criticized a senator for his position on the Vietnam war, and
was included in the target's file even though it was written by the target's father.
201. See, e.g., id. Target E, at 197, 203 (articles of incorporation and annual report of
nonprofit corporation). The Detroit Police Department and Michigan State Police have reo
leased such information to Congressional Committees. See, e.g., HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE
SUB,COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE EXTENT OF SUBVERSION IN THE NEW LEFT, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
part 8 at 1118·25, 1127-28, and part 9 at 1227-31, 1243-44 (1971).
202. See, e.g., Detroit Police Files, supra note 127, Target J, at 426. In this instance,
the names of J's parents, the witnesses, and the rabbi at the wedding were included with a
copy of the marriage license in an entry on J's Master Index Card.
203. See, e.g., id. Target J, at 364-72.
204. Id. Target B, at 217.
205. Id. 213, 220; Target A, at 247. Source 009 is a police informant.
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[political organization newspaper] MAILING LIST per
009. 206
27. July 1971, See File 1692, confidential phone list put
out by the local chapter of the [political organization].
This in reality is a . . . membership list. Subj. first name,
last initial and phone number appears on same. 207
28. [twenty-five page alphabetical mailing list)208
'One means of gathering a large number of names, and apparently also an end in itself, is the collection of confidential organizationallists which have been prepared by a group solely for its internal use. This includes mailing and phone lists and contributor records as well as membership lists. While some of these lists have
been made public, most are closely guarded and can be obtained
only by stealth, misrepresentation, or compulsion.
In the examples given above, police comment itself indicates
that in four instances the material gathered was considered
"confidential" or was supplied by a "confidential source." In three
of the four instances, a covert police agent was responsible for obtaining the list. The fifth item, 28, has no indication as to how the
police obtained it for filing in the target's dossier. It is noted, however, that of the four different confidential sources who provided
information concerning target E, the contact in 1972 was source 009.
This is the same confidential source who provided the confidential
lists in items 25 and 26, and tends to corroborate their acquisition
by misappropriation through misrepresentation (e.g., a covert agent
obtaining access for alleged organizational reasons), or through
stealth (e.g., theft, false arrest, or reproduction without authorization).
The two lists referred to in items 27 and 28 contain 79 and 170
names, respectively. It is apparent that the gathering of a fair number of lists, like those in the examples above, will quickly flesh out
the files of a spy unit. It is not yet certain, however, whether each
person or organization whose name appears in a police report-by
virtue of affiliation with a surveilled individual, organization, or
event-ultimately finds that he, she, or it has a personal police file.
The study sample material does not reveal whether the police subversive unit operates a selection process whereby some names
merely remain on acquired lists, and other names result in new files
being opened. A number of Master Index Cards in the study sample
206. [d. Target C, at 10.
207. [d. 12. A copy of the list referred to also appears on page 94 of Target C's file.
208. [d. Target E, at 204.
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do suggest that a file may be opened solely on the basis of a name's
appearance on a list, since some Master Index Cards contained only
a single entry noting the target's attendance at an event, or the
target's membership in an organization. The use of lists in the subversive files also provides a ready method of cross-referencing persons among organizations and associates, without laboriously surveilling all events which may occur.

6.

Cross-Referencing

It is clear from the study sample materials that information on
a given individual or organization may exist in anywhere from two
to dozens of files,209 and an examination of the study sample would
be incomplete without a discussion of the elaborate cross-references.

a.

Specific Cross-Referencing

In the study sample, there were specific cross-references to
fifty-nine files maintained under names or code numbers different
from those of the ten targets in the sample. As noted earlier, individuals or organizations had files designated by name, code number,
or both. Specific cross-referencing is the cross-referencing of information to another file by specific name or number. A few examples
are:
29. 10-5-70 Attended meeting at -Harper, DCEWN. See
rpt. dtd 10-7-70 in DCEWN file [anti-war group}. 210
30. Oct. 1970, file 509. Subj. name appears on confidential
[political organization newspaper] MAILING LIST per
009. 211
31. 5-8-71, File 1869. Report on steering committee meeting of X COALITION, held at Washington, D.C. Subj Attended. 212
32. 10-16-71 Subj. took part in demonstration at DeHoCo
[Detroit House of Correction]. See [political organization] file.213
209. Computerization could certainly be an effective means of maintaining and compiling the information gathered by a subversive unit, and would enhance the cross-referencing
system apparent in the study sample. Whether the Detroit Police Department and the Michigan State Police have computerized their subversive file systems remains an unanswered
question. Considering the magnitude of information gathered and the number of targets
surveilled and cross-referenced, the likelihood of computerized file systems should not be
discounteq.
210. Detroit Police Files, supra note 127, Target C at 1 (MIC).
211. [d. 10 (MIC).
212. [d. 8 (MIC).
213. [d. Target J, at 330 (IE).
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33. 8-25-72 Det. News art. in file 3308 . . . Subj. V, W, X,
Y and Z cosigned a letter to the Editor complaining of the
"harrassment" that their respective groups encountered in
and at a recent AIR WAR HEARING held at the City
County Building. See report of 8-14-72, C-File. 214
34. 6-5-73 File 2756, Subj. was identified at this meeting
of the [Detroit political organization] held this date at the
Central Methodist Church. 215
The total number of-specific cross-references in the study sample was 189; as many as 26 were in a single file. Given that some of
the references were to the same files, the ten targets in the study
sample would be obliged to examine a minimum of fifty-nine additional files to find all information concerning themselves. And, if
those fifty-nine files are similar to those of the study sample, an
examination of those files will necessitate another geometric jump
in order to fully explore the total amount of information which may
be contained on a single target in the Detroit Police subversive files.
Indeed, the cross-referencing is so extensive that it is impossible to
determine whether one possesses all information concerning a given
target, particularly an organization, without examining all the files
maintained by the subversive unit.
There are other compilations of material maintained by the
Detroit Police to which study sample items are specifically crossreferenced, but which were not included in the list of fifty-nine other
files because they appear to be of a different nature-supplemental
filing systems. There is independent verification of the existence of
at least two such supplemental systems. 216 For example, numerous
items in the study sample were cross-referenced to the
"demonstration file" and numerous items referred to the "photo
file," indicating that there was information contained in those other
filing systems concerning an event, meeting, individual, or organization. 217
For many events and demonstrations scheduled to occur in the
city of Detroit, at least two reports were prepared by the Detroit
Police to be filed in the demonstration file-aside from event entries
214. [d. Target C, at 19 (MIC).
215. [d. Target B, at 227 (MIC).

216. Discovery in Benkert revealed portions of the Detroit Police "demonstration file"
and "photo file." These materials are not included in the study sample, and are not available
for further discussion because of the Modified Protective Order, supra note 129. See also note
135 supra.
217. The names of these files have varied over the years; the "demonstration file" was
apparently known as the "chrono file" and the "photo file" was once the "pict. file." Detroit
Police Files, supra note 127, Target J, at 207.
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in target files. These reports are supplemental to the Detroit Police
Department Memorandum reports of demonstrations which frequently appear in the dossiers of the study sample. The supplemental demonstration file contains (1) pre-demonstration documents,
which provide notification of pending demonstrations to the police
and other agencies, and (2) post-demonstration reports, indicating
the time, place, and details of demonstrations.
In addition, the Detroit Police have photographed numerous
individuals at various events and demonstrations, sometimes collecting hundreds of photographs of a single event. Of the police
photographs examined in the study sample, a large number appeared to be concerned with isolating one or a small group of persons-probably for purposes of identification. The photographs were
general, long-range shots of a demonstration or meeting in progress,
tables distributing literature, or the wording of various signs carried
by demonstrators. Most of the photos examined related to events
open to the public, although it is impossible to determine from the
study sample whether nonpublic events were also photographed.
The photo file, and references thereto, made no indication as to the
uses of the gathered photographs, or as to whether copies of them
had ever been disseminated or used in any fashion.
b. Nonspecific Cross-Referencing
The use of nonspecific cross-referencing, in the study sample
and other subversive files, presents a problem even more complex
than that of the specific cross-referencing systems. It appears that,
in some instances, a large amount of information concerning a target is contained in a file that is not mentioned by name (or number)
in the target's file. Some examples will indicate how this conclusion
was reached, and show the wide variety of entries used for nonspecific cross-referencing:
35. 5-1-69 Subj. took part in a Black Panther rally at the
Detroit Federal Building to free Huey Newton. 218
While there is no specific
reference in this item to any file concernr
ing the Black Panther Party, the entry resulted from surveillance
of a Black Panther event. For clarity, consider the following entry
that preceded item 35 in the target's file:
36. 10-18-68 Sur. obs. X at WSU [Wayne State University] Black Panther Meeting, Eldridge Cleaver is a scheduled speaker. 219
218.
219.

[d. Target J, at 329 (IE).
[d.
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It is interesting to note that the target in whose file the above entries
are contained is a white male who at no time was a member of the
Black Panther Party. The cross-referencing becomes more apparent
in the next entry, which preceded item 36:
37. 8-17-68 Sur. obs. [license number of target's vehicle]
vicinity of Michigan Union Building, Ann Arbor. See Black
Panther file. 220

While there is no specific cross-reference to items 35 and 36, unlike
item 37, the question is raised whether there is information concerning items 35 and 36 in the Black Panther Party file. Unfortunately,
this question cannot be answered solely on the basis of information
contained in the study sample.
Another type of nonspecific cross-referencing results when the
subversive unit deploys "surveillance crews." Many files frequently
referred to "surveillance crews," in cars or otherwise, observing certain addresses and actually following specific individuals around
the city or state. The resulting eIitries are quite similar:
38. 12-29-70 Subj. car obs. by sur. crew pk. vic.
of---John Lodge. 221
39. 5-8-73 Subj. Obs. at U. S. Post Office at Greenfield
and Longfellow, Dearborn. 222
40. 6-1-73 Surv. Obs. subj. and unk. w/f into [sic] the
McKenny Union at EMU, Ypsilanti [Eastern Michigan
University], later followed to apt. complex at---Rose,
Ann Arbor .223
It is not clear from these entries whether there is information
concerning the targets, or related to these entries, in other files of
the subversive unit. Two factors, however, suggest that such further
information may be found: first, no report or document in the target's file made any references to the information and surveillance
noted in the surveillance crew entries for that target, and no report
or other information dated on or near the date of the crew entry
appeared ·in the target's file. The surveillance crew entry must,
therefore, have come from information not contained in the target's
file, but maintained elsewhere. Second, documents entitled
"surveillance reports" were observed in a target organization's file,
and appear to be part of extensive surveillance operations directed
220.
221.
222.
223.

[d.
[d.
[d. Target B, at 208 (IE).
[d. 209 (IE).
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at that organization and some of its members. This indicates that
various organizations are subjected to an information gathering process that is more intense than is ordinarily employed, including,
perhaps, 24 hour surveillance of the organizations' offices and meeting places or of the homes of some of its members, or moving surveillance of organization members as they go about their daily business.
It is apparent, therefore, that the files of all organizations with
which a target was associated during the period of surveillance must
be explored in order to isolate and examine the source and meaning
of the usually cryptic entries in the target's own file. For example,
what is the significance of this entry?: .
41. 5-6-73 Subj. observed in Wayne State area. 224
Comparison of addresses placed under surveillance with home
addresses of the targets in the study sample reveals that many surveillance crew entries resulted from extensive surveillance of a target's home, and indicates that not only public forums and events
received intensive surveillance from the subversive units.
Another type of nonspecific cross-referencing occurs when an
entry included the name of a target as well as the names of other
individuals, the other individuals likely being subjects of separate
subversive files. This type of silent cross-referencing is illustrated by
the following entries:
42. 1-12-71 Subj. spoke at MCCC [Macomb County
Community College] along with R, Y and Z, copy of speech
in R's file. 225 [R is a nationally known performer and political activist.]
43. 12-30-70 Subj. attended rally at WSU [Wayne State
University] sponsored by WPP [White Panther Party].
Speakers: Y, Z and R.226
item 42 indicates that the subversive unit maintained a file on nationally known activist R. The same reference to R in another target's file (item 43) suggests that R's file may contain information
concerning the target in item 43, even though no specific references
were made to R's file.
Even basic personal history entries generate suspicion that information may be contained in other files, for example: "9/6/76 subj.
now lives at-York,-Township, with his wife M, W, X, Y and Z,
224. [d. 208 (IE).
225. [d. Target G, at 255 (IE).
226. [d. Target J, at 329 (IE).
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per 142."227 Since the names of W, X, Y, and Z appear in this
target's file, one might reasonably believe that this target's name,
and information about him, might appear in files concerning W, X,
Y, and Z.
While a significant amount of information concerning a target,
whether an individual or organization, may be found in files under
the target's name or number, an equally significant amount of information concerning a target can be found in subversive unit files of
other individuals and organizations, as well as special
"demonstration," "photo," and "surveillance" files. The number of
different files that would have to be examined to discover all the
information gathered on a single individual or organization would
be staggering, particularly when an individual has participated in
a large number of political organizations and events. Likewise, examination of large numbers of files would be required to determine
the nature of police techniques and activities directed against a
single target.
IV. ANALYSIS
The presentation of the evidence from the study sample necessitates some analysis and interpretation, not only of the structure
and outline of the gathered information, as appeared previously in
this Article, but also of its content.

A.

Method of Analysis
1. Definitions and Categories
The key to a system of analysis lies in the guideline chosen.
Since the concern of this Article, and often of courts confronting
police-spying litigation, is whether the police are improperly invading protected first amendment activities, the defhiition of
"protected political activity" becomes the touchstone of this analysis.
The first step in the analysis is determining the "activity" element of the definition of "protected political activity." If an I.E.
Card entry does not indicate an activity, but rather indicates some
other type of information, e.g., marital status or organizational affiliation, then that entry will be categorized as an "other item"-a
miscellaneous category for items not "protected political activity."
The second element of "protected political activity," and the second
step in the analysis, is determining what activity is political and
categorizing nonpolitical activity entries as "other items."
227. See note 162 & accompanying text supra.
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"Political" is used here in a broad sense, embracing all expressive
activity involving the use of speech, press, association, assembly, or
petition rights to present a point of view on an issue of public concern.
The final element of "protected political activity" is distinguishing between "protected" and "nonprotected" political activity. Political activity is not necessarily synonymous with expressive
activity protected by the first amendment: bombings, kidnapping,
hijacking, and other violence are often undertaken in the name of a
political principle. There is no question that such events have occurred, but their frequency and relation to peaceful political activity
is much less clear. Of course, criminal acts have also occurred in the
context of otherwise protected political activity, whether a street
corner speech, leafletting, or a mass demonstration. The extent to
which police have been involved with this latter .type of political
violence, as provocateurs rather than gendarmes, raises serious
questions of whether police surveillance of political activities is actually for legitimate violence- and crime-prevention purposes. Unfortunately, these questions are beyond the scope of this Article. 228
The distinction between protected and nonprotected political
activity, for the purpose of this analysis, is determined by categorizing those items on the I.E. Cards that the police have characterized
as "political," and that the United States Supreme Court has determined are entitled to first amendment protection. It should be
noted that, in this analysis, the categorization of activity noted in
the I.E. Card indexes and police reports has been drawn solely from
the police descriptions of the activity contained in those documents.
In all instances, it is the language and perception of the police that
is used in categorizing and defining "protected political activity."
After the primary analysis, categorizing items as either
"protected political activity" or "other items," a further analysis
will be made of the items falling in the "protected political activity"
category. This further analysis will divide the items into those ap228. The issue of police use of informants and undercover agents in connection with
political surveillance is a complex and fascinating one beyond the scope of this Article. See
Crowley, Chapter 5, post. For a further discussion of this area, see generally CmZENS RESEARCH & INVESTIGATION COMM., THE GLASS HOUSE TAPES (1973); C. PERKUS, COINTELPRO,
THE FBI's SECRET WAR ON POLmCAL FREEDOM (1976); P. WATTERS & S. GILLERS, INvESTIGATING
THE FBI (1973); Donner, The Confession of an FBI Informer, HARPER'S, December 1972;
Donner, The Informer, THE NATION, April 10, 1954, at 678-99; Donner, Let Him Wear a Wolf's
Head: What the FBI Did to William Albertson, 3 CIV. Lm. REV. 12 (1976); Marx, Thoughts
on a Neglected Category of a Social Movement Participant: The Agent Provocateur and the
Informant, 80 AM. J. SOC. 402 (1974); Marx, Undercover Cops: Creative Policing or Constitutional Threat, 4 CIV. Lm. REv. 34 (1977); Note, Domestic Intelligence Informants, The First
Amendment and the Need for Prior Judicial Review, 26 BUFF. L. REv. 173 (1977}.
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parently occurring in a public forum and those apparently occurring
elsewhere-either on private property or on public property not dedicated in any way to public dissent. It is obvious that demonstrations, rallies, parades, and picketing conducted in public streets,
parks, and other areas raise different municipal concerns than nonpublic forum activities. Likewise, nonpublic forum activities raise
different constitutional concerns than public forum activities. 229
An item on an I.E. Card was placed in the public forum subcategory if the police language indicated the location of the event
as a public forum. In addition, the event was assumed to have
occurred in a public forum if the police described the event as a
"rally," "parade," or "demonstration," unless there was specific
indication in the police description to indicate that the activity did
not occur in a public forum. This means of subcategorizing is likely
to favor placing more-rather than fewer-items In the public
forum subcategory. Items included in the nonpublic forum subcategory include large rallies and demonstrations occurring in private
buildings as well as small gatherings in private homes and offices.
On occasion, reference was made to documents in the study sample
other than the I.E. Cards to determine whether an activity in an I.E.
Card entry occurred in a public or nonpublic forum.

2. Example of Analysis Method
To illustrate and clarify the method of analysis explained
above, consider the following detailed examination of the entries on
the I.E. Card indexes for target H. Of the forty entries on the three
cards which make up the I.E. Card index for H, thirty-six have been
categorized as "protected political activity," and the remaining four
have been categorized as "other items." Although it seems laborious
to list all forty entries, it is, in reality, the shortest, most efficient
means of demonstrating the system of analysis and it shows that the
categorization is not difficult.
Target H had the following seventeen entries for apparent public forum protected political activity:
(a) 12/24/1965 Chairman of "citizens for Peace in Vietnam" procession.
(b) 2/1/1966 [anti-war group] parade and rally.
(c) 3/26/1966 [anti-war group] parade and rally.
(d) 10/26/1968 Anti-war parade.
229. Police Surveillance of activities in private nonpublic forums also raise interesting
questions with regard to the right of privacy and the fourth amendment, unfortunately this
too is beyond the scope of this Article.
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2/28/1969 Member of [legal organization] picketed
Common Pleas Court (Landlord-Tenant).
(f) 6/30/1969 Federal Building. . . demonstration.
(g) 4/14/70 Sur obs subj. at GM Building protesting GM
profits from Vietnam War.
(h) 4/15/70 Sur obs subj. at Kennedy Square anti-war
rally, appeared to be running rally.
(i) 5/30/70 Coordinator for Memorial Day march and rally
at Kennedy Square.
(j) 6/15/70 Participated in rally at Cobo Hall against V.
P. Agnew.
(k) 10/31/70 Attended demo at Kennedy Square (Moratorium to End the War).
(1) 11/24/70 Sub participated in anti-war demonstration
at Federal Building sponsored by [anti-war organizations].
(m) 2/10/71 Per 321-spoke at [political organization]
rally WSU [Wayne State University].
(n) 2/18/71 Attended a [anti-war organization] meeting
at WSU.
(0) 10/12/71 Subj. spoke at candlelight ceremony at City
Hall sponsored by the [peace group].
(p) 4/29/72 Subj. obs. at Northland Shopping Center Mall
at [anti-war organization] demonstration against ·the war.
(q) 4/5/73 Subj. obs. frt. of Fed. Bldg., [anti-war organization] demo, U.S. out of SE Asia. 230
(e)

The 19 other entries contained in target H's index which relate
to protected political activity apparently occurred in nonpublic forums:
(aa) 10/5/70 Attended a meeting at police hdgs. re: [antiwar organization] march on 10/31/70 in Detroit (National
Peace Action Day) anti-war march.
(bb) 10/26/70 Subj. chaired steering comm. meeting of
[anti-war organization].
(cc) 11/9/70 Subj. chaired a meeting of the [anti-war organization] . . . . Also talked about the 3 day Winter Soldier Investigation (American War Crimes) to be held at
Veterans Mem. Bldg. 12-1-2-3-70.
(dd) 11/23/70 Chaired meeting of steering comm. of
[anti-war organization] held at First Unitarian Church.
230. Detroit Police Files, supra note 127, Target H, at 249-51.
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(ee) 12/4/6/70 Sub attended convention of {national
peace group] and met with National Steering Committee
at Chicago, Illinois.
(ff) 11/21/70 Subj. spoke at a political meeting at U of D
"[University of Detroit]. Spoke regarding the [peace
group] convention to be held in Chicago . . . per 321 rpt.
(gg) 10/19/70 Member of steering comm. [national peace
group]-see rpt. from Parma, Ohio PD dated 11/17/70 in
[political organizational] file. Subj. representing [antiwar organization].
(hh) 12/26-31/70 Attended [political organization] Natl
Conc. NYNY. See MSP rpt dtd 1/7 /71 in [political organization] file.
(ii) 1/16/71 Attended a [national peace group] meeting,
-Howard, subj. was chairman.
.
(jj) 1/25/71 Sub attended and chaired meeting of [antiwar organization] at-Third (steering committee).
(kk) 2/8/71 Attended meeting of the [anti-war organization] held at -Third.
(11) 2/22/71 Chaired meeting of the [anti-war organization] held at -Third.
(mm) 4/5/71 Attended meeting of the [anti-war organization] held at -Methodist Church ..
(nn) 5/3/71 Chairman meeting of the [anti-war organization] at-Methodist Chrch.
(00) 7/2-4/71 Sub attended [anti-war organization]
Conv. NYNY per source 1023.
(pp) 7/1/71 Subject attended [anti-war organization]
meeting, WSU per source 1023.
(qq) 2/8/72 Sub. attended meeting of steering committee
of [political organization].
(rr) 2/11/72 Sub. reported to have gone to Paris for leftist
ralley re: Vietnam Peace Talks.
(ss) 7/28/72 Sub. obs with wife exiting vehicle and entering [address of political organization].231
Finally, of the four entries in target H's index that were categorized as "other items" because they do not relate to a specific political activity, two are clearly of political nature (but not "activity"):
12/15/69 Co-chairman of [anti-war organization].
231. ld.
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12/15/70 Sub is reported to be a national coordinator for
the [national peace group] (per report dated 12/10/70).232
The other two items included in the "other items" category are
nonpolitical:
3/6/74 Subj. was divorced from his wife . . . . Subj. was
plaintiff case no.73-[number].
74 Subj. is suppose [sic] to be married to [X] per source
info.233
There is, of course, much information not revealed by the I.E.
Card entries, and the scope of this analysis is thereby limited. For
example, it could be argued that the various "steering committee"
meetings which H attended were for planning the imminent overthrow of the government, the bombing of a government building, or
the disruption of a public rally. This could be the case with any
meeting between two or more human beings. This uncertainty is the
reason for basing the categorization on police language in the entries-their language reflects their concerns. If the primary police
concern was the occurrence or planning of criminal, disruptive, or
violent activity, the analysis presumes that some indication of that
concern would appear as part of the index entry or in supporting
reports. If the police choose not to make such indication, but rather
to focus their index entry on the political views expressed, the political nature of the organization or event, or both, then the analysis
and categorization will not deviate from their choice of focus which
precipitated the index entry.
B.

Analysis of The I.E. Card Indexes
The above-described method of analysis and categorization
was applied to all the Intelligence Exchange Card indexes in the
study sample. There were nine such indexes, totalling twenty-five
pages, which contained a total of 258 entries. Chart No.3 describes
the statistical conclusions reached by examining these entries.
Of the 258 entries in the nine I.E. Card indexes, 223 (86.4%)
focused on protected political activity. Even more interesting is that
130 (50.4%) of those entries were concerned with protected political
activity occurring in nonpublic forums, and only ninety-three (36%)
of the entries concerned political activity in public forums. Target
A was under surveillance for ten years and had thirty-eight entries
in her I.E. Card index, thirty-five (92%) of which concerned pro232. Id. 249-50.
233. Id. 251.
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E
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F

2

9

9

5
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3

G

3
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10

12

3

6

H

3

40

36

18

18

4

9

J

3

58

52

31

21

6

11

Total of
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25

258

223

93

130

35

54

13.6%

x

% in ea.
category

x

100%

86.4%

36%

50.4%

CHART NO.3

tected political activity. Target J, who was under surveillance for
eleven years, had flfty-eight entries, flfty-two (90%) of which concerned protected political activity. What is just as important as the
fact that an extremely high percentage of surveilled activity was
protected by the flrst amendment is the fact that, in the fifty-four
human years of surveillance represented by the matrix, there was
not one reported act of serious violence, criminality, or public disruption.
In the matrix of Chart No.3, a number of entries which were
categorized as "other items" related to political information but did
not involve any "activity," and were thus excluded from the
"protected political activity" category. For example, consider the
following entries:
[In the index of Target A:]

920

JOURNAL OF URBAN LAW

[Vol. 55:877

3/6/71 Sur. obs. [license no.] registered to X of
-Mitchell, arrived at -Grand River, with a small child,
entered with the child.234
[Target B:]
8/6/69 Info. received from Source that above is the president of [political organization]. SEE [POLITICAL ORGANIZATION] FILE.235
[Target H:]
12/15/69 Co-chairman of [anti-war organization].236
[Target J:]
2/3/71 Info. per 219 subject professes to believe in Anarchy.237

All four of these items relate to political information. The items
concerning Targets B, H, and J are self-evidently political. The item
concerning Target A is found to be political in nature when it is
revealed that the addresses included in the entry are, at other points
in A's I.E. Card index, identified as meeting places of a·particular
political organization. It is quite likely, therefore, that this item
concerning A could also warrant categorization as a nonpublic
forum protected political activity item. Thus, even though nonactivity and ambiguous items were categorized as "other items,"
nearly all of the thirty-five items could have been included in the
political category.
V.

CONCLUSION

The information and analysis in this study is useful in addressing two related concerns. First, it casts new light on the issue of
whether the traditional police justifications for political surveillance
comport with the product of their efforts. Second, it challenges certain presumptions and attitudes adopted by many judges in evaluating court challenges to police surveillance activities.
A. Police Justification vs. Police Product
While the interests assertedly pursued by police through their
political surveillance systems have been variously stated, almost all
characterizations come down to the need to prevent disruptions,
violence, and other criminal activity provoked or caused by political
dissenters.238 Few persons would disagree with the police that pre234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
POUCE

[d. Target A, at 234.
[d. Target B, at 206.
[d. Target H, at 249.
[d. Target J, at 330.
For a general discussion of the government viewpoint of this issue, see A. BOUZA,
INrELUGENCE: THE OPERATIONS OF AN INVESTIGATIVE UNIT (1976); D. SCHULTZ & L.
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vention of crime and violence is a proper governmental function, but
two critical questions remain unanswered, notwithstanding this
concession. First, in the case of political surveillance, are the asserted justifications real, or are they only illusory and put forth to
meet criticism and forestall further inquiry?239 Second, even if, to
some extent, these justifications really are the concern of the police,
are the various means allegedly used to meet the concerns related
in any significant way to their accomplishment?
The conclusions of this study appear to indicate that prevention of crime or violence is not a substantial police concern in their
use of political surveillance. First, all of the material examined is
written in the police department's own words .. The documents reflect actual police concerns, and were never intended for public
diclosure or examination. They therefore do not reflect any police
need to "justify" their activities, but only what they actually did.
Second, none of the information in the study sample-an accumulation of fifty-four years of surveillance-relates to, or reflects a
concern with, the prevention or solution of crimes or violence. Not
a single violent or criminal act is discussed in the materials. The
only violent or criminal acts suggested in the materials involve the
activities of police or police informants. Third, virtually all of the
information contained in the materials is concerned with the political views and associations of the people placed under surveillance.
While police have consistently maintained that their interest is
in the prevention of law violation, and not in political surveillance
causing infringement of first amendment rights, this study sample
indicates that the opposite is true.240 The study sample reflects no
evidence of violence or illegality, and further, no police concern with
it. This, then, should begin to instruct courts that the dilemma
which the police version of events has thrust upon us-that there
are apparentiy irreconcilable demands between security and free
expression-is not a real dilemma at all.241 Unless one is willing to
equate dissent with criminality and protest with violence, there is
NORTON, POUCE OPERATIONAL lNTEWGENCE (1973); P. SCHULTZ & K. SCO'IT, THE SUBVERSIVE
(1973); Skousen, u.s. Police in a Cultural Crisis, 18 & 19 LAw AND ORDER (1970·71) (twenty·
one part series that appeared monthly from Mar. 1970 to Nov. 1971).
239. "[W]e can no longer seriously doubt that the main purpose of such activity is
[the] political control of dissent or that the frequently advanced justifications of law enforce·
ment or national security are often no more than a 'cover'." Donner, The Theory and Practice
of American Political Intelligence, NEW YORK REV. OF BOOKS, April 27, 1971, at 27·39.
240. See, e.g., Kelley, Message From The Director, 43 FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN
(1974).
241. Donner, The Theory and Practice of American Political Intelligence, NEW YORK
REVIEW OF BOOKS, April 27, 1971, at 39.
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little, if any, "security" interest which the present political surveillance apparatus serves. 242
Even assuming that surveillance does, to some extent, serve the
government interest of crime prevention, this study has conluded
that, contrary to police assertions, there is a total absence of precision, care, or meaningful evalution involved in implementation of
the system. Thus, it is impossible to tell how a decision is made to
include an individual or organization in the surveillance pattern.
The decision appears almost haphazard. The only sure guidepost is
that it will be the political views or associations of a target which
will trigger the initial inquiry. The police argument that innocent
people are only occasionally or accidently included in the files along
with subversives and potential lawbreakers is completely unsupported by this study. Indeed, two of the study sample targets were
kept under constant surveillance for over ten years without the
slightest" hint of impropriety or illegality.243
The operation of the system as demonstrated in the study was
overbroad and undisciplined in another way. There appears to be
no meaningful way to explain when and why certain surveillance
techniques were used. Whether the technique was physical surveillance, shadowing, use of informers, inquiries to third parties, or
unlawful police intrusions, the "trigger" for the use of the technique,
and the limits on it once implemented, appeared without rational
pattern.
Whether the "means" analysis of police political spying focuses
on who the police include as a target, or on what the police do in
implementing the system, the conclusion drawn from this study is
the same: the system is drastically overbroad, and is structured in
such a way that it would appear to be impossible to narrow its reach
short of dismantling it. Since "who" is included is explicitly based
on political views and associations, and "what" the police do is
governed by no discernable standards whatever-except to further
the ultimate goal of deterring dissent-there appears to be nothing
legitimate to preserve.

R.

Enlightening Juc#cial Attitudes

"How to inform the judicial mind . . . is one of the most com242. "[T]he police often view protest as an intrusion rather than a contribution to our
political processes." J. SKOLNICK, THE POLITICS OF PROTEST: VIOLENT ASPECTS OF PROTEST AND
CONFRONTATION 194 (1969). Professor Skolnick further adds that "in protest situations [the
policeman's] political views often seem to control their actions." [d. 187.
243. See Detroit Police Files, supra note 127, Targets A and J. Targets B, C, E, F, G,
and H were under surveillance for over five years.
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plicated problems."244 A judge's performance on the bench is largely
based upon his life experience. The conflict often arises as to
whether judges are "in sympathy with the spirit of their times"245
or merely with the spirit of the group "in which the accidents of
birth or education or occupation or fellowship"246 have placed them.
Yet one hopes that whatever prejudices judges may harbor will be
substantially reduced if accurate information on- the critical issues
is readily available.
What this study hopes to convey to the judiciary is twofold.
First, police activity in the area of political surveillance is the opposite of what it is projected as being. Second, judicial withdrawal
from the evaluation ~f the merits of challenges to surveillance activities reinforces the police myth that spying on political activity is
.for the prevention of unlawful violence. At this juncture the courts
are asked only to fulfill their constitutional mission to undertake the
task of evaluating challenges to surveillance systems on the merits.
The judicial system is no part of the national security-Iawenforcement establishment. The courts should make a commitment
to reconciliation of the conflicting demands of the government and
citizen when actual disputes arise. Judges must recognize that resolving these cases in favor of the police by obscure holdings fashioned around justiciability issues without a more thorough analysis
is capitulation to, and acceptance of, the very assumptions under
challenge.
While in any individual case, the government may ultimately
prevail on the merits, the decision would be reflective of mythology
rather than reality if the court refuses to allow the challenger's
claims to be litigated fully. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in the
Anderson247 decision, could not have appreciated the full irony of its
comment when it deferred totally to the governmental position and
stated: "We cannot know how little we know until we listen. "248
Justice Marshall very aptly expressed the basic feeling that envelops the domestic political surveillance system when he said:
"[T]he value of a sword of Damocles is that it hangs-not that it
dropS."249
244. Oral argument, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reprinted in L. FRIEDARGUMENT 63 (1969). See Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, The Adversary System,
and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REv. 1187
(1975).
245. Id. at 1217, quoting B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 174 (1921).
MAN,

246. Id.
247. Anderson v. Sills, 66 N.J. 210, 265 A.2d 678 (1970).
248. Id. at 228, 265 A.2d at 687.
249. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 231 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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APPENDIX A":
NAME

IE

ALIAS

FILE

DESCRIPTION

DOB 6-17-48 w/1
5/6, 125, Brn Hr, Grn Eyes
SS 000-00-0000

Made 5.9

IDNO
FBI NO
MSB NO
PHONE

Newport, Southfield, Mich
Meadow Lake, Birmingham

ADDRESS

6-28-71
AUTO

65 Pont Cony
(reg to ................ )

LICENSE .....•.•.•••.•

EMPLOYMENT
REMARKS

10-5-70 attended meeting at 60 Harper, [organization]
See rpt dtd 10-7-70 in [same] file.
10-31-70 attended moratorium day anti war demo at

REFERENCES

Kennedy Sq. Sponsored by [organization]
Detroit Police Department - Criminal Information Bureau
Form C of D-102-CA (7-62)
MASTER INDEX CARD

D.P.D.381

*The information portrayed is the printer's simulation of the
original Master Index Card.
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APPENDIX B*
NAME

FIRST

DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT
Criminal Information Bureau

MIDDLE

ADDRESS

Meadow Lake (Birmingham, Mich)
PHQNE

AUTOMOBILE

LICENSE NO

Pont. Conv

PHOTO

BIRTH DATE

COLOR

6-17-48

ASSOCIATES

HEIGHT

5'6"

W/F

WEIGHT

HAIR

125

brn.

EYES

grn

INFORMATION SUBMITTED BY

DATE

Crouter

2-28-71

DPD NO

CIB NO

FBI NO

OTHER NOS. (SPECIFY AGENCY)
SS 000-00-0000

members of: .... ; .... ; .... ;
IPC

LOCALITIES FREQUENTED
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------------------

BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION

._------CRIMINAL HISTORY

6-15-71 info. 629-sub. reported as arrested at Canada Tunnel for poss. of
Narcotics, released, no case.
SEE INDEX CARD FOR DETAILED INFO. PRIOR TO FEB. 28,1972.
REMARKS:

10-5-70 to present has been very active with the [org], usually helps to
make arrangements for transportation for out of town demonstrations or
meetings.
5-8-71 sub. attended meeting of the Steering Comm. of the [org] Wash. DC
7-2, 4-71 attended [org.] convention NY, NY.
11-18-72 subj att demo at Kennedy Square sponsored by [org.].
INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE CARD
ADDITIONAL DATA ON REVERSE

*The information portrayed is the printer's simulation of the
original I.E. Card.
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C'~

DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: January 10, 1973
Commanding Officer, Intelligence Section
Subject:

MEETING OF [Anti-War Organization]

Covered by Sergeant Stanley Perich and Patrolman Harold Mertz
of the Intelligence Section, Subversive Detail.
On Monday evening January 8, 1973 at 7 :30 P.M., the ....... .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . held a meeting at the ... ' ......... .
METHODIST CHURCH ................... Detroit, Michigan.
There were 62 persons in attendance.
The Chairman for the meeting was one, .................... .
white/male of ............... Apt. No. 304, Detroit, Michigan. He
is a tall male 23 years old/175 lbs. This subject is new to this area
and active in the [Political] PARTY and the [Anti-war organization]. NOTE - this subject was referred to in previous reports as
The principle speaker was ....................... white/male
Attorney of ........... Griggs, Detroit, Michigan. This subject
is co-chairman of the [Anti-war organization], gave an inspirational
speech explaining why the anti-war demonstration will be held in
Washington D.C., explaining it is being conducted as a reminder to
the American people that they did not vote for an escalation of the
war in Vietnam, but instead voted for the peace promises given by
Nixon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . called for a united effort for the
upcoming D.C. demonstration against the President.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , white/female of ........... .
Meadow Lake, Birmingham, Michigan. Dob: 6-17-48/5'6"/125/
brown hair/green eyes. This subject is co-ordinator for the [Antiwar organization]. This subject gave a report on the planned
happenings to occur prior to the groups leaving for Washington
D.C. She detailed the plans for a heavy distribution of literature,
showing a leaflet she wanted especially distributed to High Schools
and College Campuses, and among all organizations which have shown
t;The information portrayed is the printer's simulation of the
original Memorandum.
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an interest in anti-war activities. She stated that the Coalition office
is being swamped with phone calls from people with requests
regarding transportation to the Capita1. ....................... .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . asked for help in setting up information and
distribution centers throughout the Detroit area, so people would not
have to go to the New Center area to pick-up literature. She pleaded
with those present to help in the planning of the Capital demonstration .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , white/female of ...... Seward Apt No.
403, Dob: 6-1-52 active in the [org.] and the [org.], gave a report
on the transportation set-up. The Coalition has ordered six buses to
date. They are not actually organizing car pools per se, but will do
the best they can to line up a registration of available vehicles for the
pool, and provide information to people calling them for same.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , male/black of ........ Townsend. This subject
is a member or supporter of the ........ movement. On 10-25-72
subjects brother, ............ was involved in a shooting at the
Martin Luther King Jr. High Schoo1. ............ gave a report on
the contacts he made with with labor organizations, reading off a
lengthy list of labor indorsers for the D.C., demonstration. He called
on others to get members of their own unions to endorse the
demonstration.
An Unknown Methodist minister, white/male gave a talk asking
for closer co-operation among the anti-war activist, especially
between the Coalition and the [another anti-war org] OFFICE. He
stated that it is confusing to the outsider when they see the
antagonism which exists between the two groups.
Several persons from the audience gave run-downs of anti-war
activities taking place at Wayne State University, University of
Detroit, Ann Arbor, Lansing, etc. One said that there is a bus load
of people leaving from Mt. Pleasant and some from Oxford Michigan.
The ......... was heavily represented at this meeting with
approximately 15 to 20 persons present. Four made talks with
regard to ......... plans stating that they (the ........ ) plans to
stay in D.C., to conduct a War and Racism seminar over the
inaugural week-end. They invited the Coalition members to take
part in the same. They said that the . . . . . . . . will cooperate with
the Coalition in their endeavor with the anti-war movement.
Discussions: speakers for the rally to be held at Kennedy Square

POLICE SURVEILLANCE

1978]

929

prior to the trip to Washington D.C. for the anti-war demonstration
at inaugeration time............. 's name was mentioned as one of
the speakers. A long list of probable speakers were mentioned but
nothing was confirmed as yet. The speakers will be announced at a
press conference to be called by the coalition.
A report meeting will be held as soon as possible after the D.C.,
demonstration. This meeting will also be used to make additional
plans for future long range programs.
The following were identified as being in attendance at the
meeting:
(Names of 22 individuals)
LNU/WM
The following is a registration of vehicles observed in the
immediate area, occupants entered for the meetings:
JWB-

69 VWCh

-305 70 Merc CH
LLS-

70 ChevCh

-264 68 Ford Sed
MLT-402

JAMES

Poe

JAMES/PATRICIA
NATHAN

Griggs

Meadow Lake, Birmingham

MAUROCE [sic]

68 Chev Sed

CATHERINE

64 Ford Ch

EUGENE

Washington, Ferndale
Ward
Lindsay

Sergeant Stanley Perich
Subversive Detail

Patrolman Harold Mertz
Subversive Detail
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DENNIS J. MULLAHY
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